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ABSTRACT 
 
Over 1.7 million hospital-associated infections (HAIs), resulting in 99,000 deaths, occur each 
year in the United States. HAIs are defined as infections that occur within 48 hours of hospital 
admission without evidence of the infection being present or incubating at the time of admission. 
HAIs are a major concern to the medical community due to the potential loss of life and high 
costs. Healthcare providers should be accountable for reducing the rates of HAIs and society 
needs to hold them accountable for the safe implementation and outcomes of the services they 
provide. 
A high-reliability organization (HRO) is commonly described as an organization that performs 
high-risk work but without rare, catastrophic events. Any industry relying heavily on human 
performance, such as healthcare, can benefit from emulating an HRO. Embedding high-
reliability principles in a healthcare organization is a proven way to increase quality and meet the 
demands of higher quality expectations. The ways HROs generate and maintain high levels of 
safety cannot be directly applied to today’s hospitals; however, a commitment to achieving zero 
patient harm events and the deployment of effective process improvement tools can enable 
hospitals to reach a safety standard comparable to HROs. 
Steps to becoming an HRO are not clearly defined; characteristics are. Correlating high-
reliability constructs with safety culture surveys provides an opportunity for survey developers 
and hospital accrediting bodies to offer better tools and guidelines pursuant to a hospital 
becoming an HRO. Positively responding to societal needs for safe implementation and 
improved hospital-associated infections outcomes will increase hospital accountability for 
patient safety. 
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PREFACE 
 
This dissertation is primarily based on literature obtained from the review of the seminal research 
performed on HROs as part of the student researcher’s graduate research assignment. While the 
literature review focused on the seminal research excluding healthcare, a conference paper was 
written that focused directly on healthcare and the implementation of high reliability theory. The 
student researcher served as the lead author and conference presenter and was responsible for the 
primary paper composition and data analysis. This dissertation came about as a direct interest in 
the healthcare system’s difficult transition to become an HRO and the increasing number of 
patient deaths due to preventable hospital-associated errors. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide suggestions that can be useful to hospitals, 
accrediting bodies, or patient safety survey developers to improve patient safety outcomes by 
coupling high reliability theory with hospital safety-related measures. The scope of this 
dissertation is limited to the avoiding infections safety measure of the Consumer Reports safety 
score composite, specifically the hospital-associated infections and the hospital patient safety 
culture survey. Finally, the dissertation recommendations were developed as a result of relational 
analyses identified in correlating HRO theory and a hospital safety-related measure. 
The journey to the doctorate of philosophy has been over 8 years for the student. The shortest 
period was completing the coursework; the dissertation writing appeared to be the greatest part 
of the time. The student found that writing the dissertation was the single most focused task of 
her profession. She learned the importance of time management, statistical analysis techniques, 
and writing styles that will be useful the rest of her professional career. Most of all, she learned 
how to summarize and properly document the works of others and the power of persistence. The 
race is truly not given to the swift, but to those who endure to the end (Author Unknown). 
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CHAPTER I  
GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
Hospital-Associated Infections (HAIs) are defined as infections that occur within 48 hours of 
hospital admission “without evidence of the infection being present or incubating at the time of 
admission” (Koch, Nilsen, Dalheim, Cox & Harthug, 2014, p. 284). Three HAIs are examined in 
this research: Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infections (CAUTIs), Central Line-Associated 
Blood Stream Infections (CLABSIs) and Surgical Site Infections (SSIs) from colon surgery. 
According to the Comprehensive Accreditation Manuals for Hospitals: The Official Handbook 
(The Joint Commission, 2011), CAUTIs are urinary tract infections that are associated with the 
patient having an indwelling urinary catheter. CAUTIs are diagnosed based on the patients' 
symptomatic and asymptomatic urinary tract infections without symptoms, causing septicemia (a 
bloodstream infection) within 48 hours after insertion of the catheter (The Joint Commission, 
2015). “An indwelling urinary catheter is a drainage tube that is inserted into the urinary bladder 
through the urethra, [and] is left in place” (Gould, Umscheid, Agarwal, Kuntz, & Pegues, 2009, 
p. 22). Infection control measures may be used to prevent many CAUTIs (Gould et al., 2009). 
Central lines are catheters inserted directly into a large vein and used to deliver fluids, 
medication, and nutrition to patients. Central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) 
are caused when bacteria collect on the line and enter the bloodstream and are the most serious 
type of HAI (The Joint Commission, 2015). CAUTIs and CLABSIs are among the three most 
common HAIs (Limaye, Mastrangelo, & Zerr, 2008). The third most common HAI is ventilator-
associated pneumonia; however, this type of HAI is not used in the infection safety scoring 
composite. SSIs are surgery-related infections (occurring within 30 days of the surgical 
procedure) on or close to the skin surface or in any part of the body that is opened and 
manipulated during surgery (The Joint Commission, 2015). 
Consumer Reports (2015) created hospital measures or ratings to help the consumer compare 
hospital performance based on their patient safety score and individual measures relating to 
patient experience, patient outcomes, and certain hospital practices. The Consumer Reports 
safety score composite uses the following “five major categories of safety-related measures, each 
with several components: 
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 Avoiding Infections,  
 Avoiding Readmissions,  
 Avoiding Mortality,  
 Communication about discharge and medications, and 
 Appropriate use of scanning” (Consumer Reports, 2015, pp. 39–40). 
The five categories have equal weights in calculating the hospital safety score. The calculations 
for the total weight (20%) for the first category, avoiding infections, is based on a combined 
CLABSI, CAUTI, and SSIs (Consumer Reports, 2015). Again, these three HAIs are examined in 
this research. 
 
1.1 Background 
At least “210,000 deaths per year were [researched and] associated with preventable harm in 
hospitals” (James, 2013, p. 122). A 2008 Forbes article stated that out of every 200 patients who 
spend one night in the hospital, one will die from a medical error and 12 will contract an HAI 
(Stokes, 2013). HAIs are major, yet often preventable, threats to patient safety; about 1 in 25 
hospital patients have at least one HAI during their hospital stay (Centers for Disease Control & 
Prevention [CDC], 2015). When a patient enters the hospital for one medical problem, he or she 
does not want to experience an additional infection during the stay. The number of patient deaths 
related to HAIs is costly. The last 20 years have documented healthcare costs that exceed 18% of 
the U.S. gross domestic product (Health Forum, 2014; Stokes, 2013). “The excess hospi tal cost 
of HAIs [alone] . . . was estimated to be between 28 and 45 billion dollars annually” (Stone et al., 
2010, p. 433). The healthcare industry still needs change, despite its focus over many decades on 
improving patient safety errors (Blouin & McDonagh, 2011). 
Nearly 80,000 bloodstream infections (BSIs) occur annually in intensive care units (ICUs) 
(Limaye et al., 2008), with reported mortality of 12–25% for CLABSIs (“Vital Signs,” 2011). 
“The attributable cost per infection is estimated to be $34,000–$56,000, and the annual cost of 
caring for patients with BSIs ranges from $296 million to $2.3 billion” (Limaye et al., 2008, p. 
404). Urinary tract infections (UTIs) account for more than 30% of the total number of HAIs in 
some reports and affect an estimated 600,000 patients per year (Gould et al., 2009). “The average 
cost of one hospital-associated UTI is estimated to be $680 to $1,875 per patient infection, and 
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additional hospital days per patient . . . ranges between 2 to 4 days” (Limaye et al., 2008, p. 405). 
It is a given that CLABSIs, CAUTIs, and SSIs are common, expensive, and—by their very 
nature—preventable (Stone et al., 2010). The public relies on performance and quality of care 
data on hospitals which provides the public a sense of institutional accountability (Richards, 
2009). The popular source of such public information is often the Consumer Reports. While not 
a scholarly journal, it is widely available to the general public and thus is a source of information 
on hospital performance and quality of care data. The pressure is on hospital program 
accreditation bodies, such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations, (herein referred to as “the Joint Commission”), to report hospital accountability 
data to the American public. The Joint Commission is a private, independent, not-for-profit 
accreditation agency for over 20,500 healthcare organizations in the United States. It establishes 
guidelines for the operation of hospitals and other healthcare facilities, conducts accreditation 
programs and surveys, and encourages the attainment of high standards of institutional medical 
care. The vision of the Joint Commission (2014) is for all people to always experience the safest 
and highest quality health care across all settings. 
The Joint Commission, in early 2000, set a goal to learn about and emulate highly reliable 
organizations (HROs) that operate safely in high-risk conditions and later adopted HRO in 
health care as it relates to patient safety. Joint Commission accreditation and certification is 
recognized nationwide as a symbol of quality that reflects an organization’s commitment to 
meeting certain performance standards. One of the benefits of achieving the Joint Commission 
accreditation is that it strengthens community confidence in the quality and safety of care, 
treatment and services of the facility. Achieving such certification makes a strong statement to 
the community about an organization’s efforts to provide the highest quality services.  
The Joint Commission partners with accredited health care organizations (hospitals, home care 
providers, and nursing homes) to improve health care systems. The Joint Commission partners 
with the community to provide accredited organizations that are continually focused on 
eliminating systems failures and human errors that may cause harm to patients, families and 
staff. Safety is what patients, families, staff and the public expect from Joint Commission–
accredited organizations. Dr. Mark R. Chassin, president and chief executive officer of the Joint 
Commission and the late, Dr. Jerod M. Loeb, former executive vice president of the Joint 
Commission, “discovered that the ways high-reliability organizations generate and maintain high 
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levels of safety cannot be directly applied to today’s hospitals” (Chassin & Loeb, 2013, p. 459). 
However, a commitment to achieving zero patient harm, the organization’s safety culture and the 
deployment of effective process improvement tools enables hospitals to reach a quality of safety 
comparable to HROs (Chassin & Loeb, 2013). 
Given the strong interest in HROs by the Joint Commission and health care practitioners alike, in 
2008, the Joint Commission Center for Transforming Health Care, an affiliate of the Joint 
Commission, was created to assist hospitals transforming into HROs by offering highly effective, 
durable solutions to healthcare’s most critical safety and quality problems. “Embedding high-
reliability principles in a healthcare organization is a proven way to improve quality and meet the 
demands of higher-quality expectations” (Stokes, 2013, p. 28). Chassin and Loeb (2013) 
developed an implementation framework that defines the stages of maturity they believe a 
hospital must pass on their journey to become an HRO. These stages are much like the lifecycle 
of a project in project management. Yet, no research has been found supporting the Joint 
Commission’s expectation of the hospitals it accredits in adopting high-reliability concepts as 
they relate to patient safety. Without inspection criteria or requirements instituted by the primary 
accrediting body, what is the hospital’s motivation to adopt HRO principles and practices as they 
relate to patient safety? 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
There is a societal concern with the number of HAIs due to preventable and hospital-associated 
errors. HAIs “are major concerns to the medical community due to the potential loss of life and 
high costs” (Limaye et al., 2008, p. 404). “Healthcare providers should be accountable for 
reducing rates of infection” (Richards, 2009, p. 72). HAIs affect the lives of patients and strain 
hospital resources while adding to the cost of healthcare (Limaye et al., 2008). 
Increasingly, hospitals are applying lessons learned from best-in-class patient safety and 
patient satisfaction programs to address safety and health. Built around high reliability 
principles endorsed by the Joint Commission, these programs embrace a no-blame culture 
to de-stigmatize interventions . . . and promote high reliability behaviors to reinforce best 
practices and prevents patient safety events (Occupational Safety & Health 
Administration, 2013, p. 1). 
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With the increased possibility for human error that may lead to an adverse patient safety event, 
the healthcare industry is a primary candidate for preventing human error by emulating HROs 
(Tolk, Cantu, & Beruvides, 2014). “In an integrated patient safety system, staff and hospital 
leaders work together to learn from their patient safety events, including close calls and other 
system failures that have not led to patient harm” (The Joint Commission, 2015, p. PS-2). 
The aim of the safety culture should be to balance learning with accountability (American 
College of Surgeons, 2014). One platform for becoming a highly reliable healthcare system is 
higher public accountability (Stokes, 2013). Chassin and Loeb (as cited in Blouin & McDonagh, 
2011, p. 399) “defined accountability measures as those with a strong research basis, those where 
the process being measured is closely linked to the patient care outcome desired.”  
Steps to become an HRO are not clearly defined, though the characteristics of an HRO are. 
Hospitals need new process improvement tools and methods to break out of their low reliability 
state (Chassin & Loeb, 2013). Developing a relationship between the hospital safety-related 
measures and high reliability theory can help provide hospitals with information to assist them in 
implementing safety programs and improve patient outcomes. The primary focus of this 
translational healthcare services research is to provide recommendations that healthcare 
organizations can use to assess their own hospital safety-related outcomes and improved patient 
safety outcomes, which will provide public accountability. 
 
1.2.1 Assumption 
The following assumptions apply to this research: 
 All safety score information obtained from the Centers for Medicare and Medical 
Services (CMS) website is factual and non-biased. 
 HRO theory is valid and can be applied to healthcare. 
 If applied to healthcare, HRO theory will improve patient safety outcomes.  
 The results of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPS) found in this 
research represent healthcare operations throughout the U.S. 
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1.2.2 Definitions 
The following are definitions for the safety score rating terms used throughout this research, 
(CAMH Update 2, 2015): 
 Adverse event. A patient safety event that resulted in harm to a patient. 
 Catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTIs). Symptomatic and asymptomatic 
urinary tract infections that are associated with the patient having an indwelling urinary 
catheters (tube inside the body inserted in an individual’s urinary bladder) and resulting 
in a bloodstream infection, within 48 hours of insertion of the catheter. 
 Central line-associated blood stream infections (CLABSIs). A bloodstream infection 
can occur when bacteria or other germs travel down a “central line” and enter the blood  
(CDC, 2012). 
 Patient Safety event. An event, incident, or condition that could have resulted or did 
result in an adverse patient outcome. 
 Surgical-site infections (SSIs). Surgery-related infections that occur on or near the skin 
surface or in any part of the body that is opened and manipulated during surgery. They 
are counted in the Consumer Health Ratings if they occur within 30 days of the surgical 
procedure. All of the states in the U.S. report data on surgical-site infections that occur 
after one or both of the following procedures: colon surgery and abdominal 
hysterectomy. 
 
Other definitions used throughout this research are provided for clarity. 
 High Reliability Organization (HRO) – Organizations with high quality and reliable 
operations that potentially can have catastrophic outcomes but consistently operate error-
free for lengthy periods of time (Bourrier, 2005). 
 Mindfulness - Focusing on and defining possible errors while creating strategies to either 
mitigate the error or contain its impact on operations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
 Patient Safety Climate – Practices, procedures or rewarded behavior that is supported 
and expected in organization (Alahmadi, 2010). 
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 Patient Safety Culture – The enduring beliefs and practices of an organization and its 
willingness to apply lessons learned. 
 
1.2.3 Delimitation 
The following limitations apply to this research: 
 The analyses are based on a limited scope of patient outcomes, HAIs for CAUTI, 
CLABSI and SSIs from colon surgery. While the data source provided HAIs from colon 
surgery and hysterectomy, colon surgery was chosen because it was inclusive of both 
men and women. 
 The avoiding infections measure is only one of the five Consumer Reports hospital safety 
related measures and is the focus of this research. Ventilator-associated pneumonia data 
is not used to calculate the total weight for avoiding infections and was therefore omitted 
from this research. 
 The research is limited to Joint Commission accredited U.S. hospitals and uses analyzed 
HAI scores that were voluntarily reported to the accrediting body over the identified 
period and not the infection rate or individual performance of a single hospital or unit. 
 The safety score data was obtained from the CMS Hospital Compare website, 
hospitalcompare.hhs.gov. The measurements collected began January 1, 2013 and ended 
December 31, 2013. 
 The Joint Commission safety-related measures, the National Patient Safety Goals, were 
not analyzed as a part of this research. 
 Though the HRO constructs used in this research are fluid, the coding performed in the 
research remains constant with the written work found in the second edition of Managing 
the Unexpected (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
 The research identifies areas of improvement in the safety surveys based on analyses, but 
does not offer a prescription for hospital safety program interventions. 
 No additional research was performed on the socioeconomic factors surrounding 
healthcare. Socioeconomic factors to consider with patient care may be educational level 
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of the patient and the care-giver, the availability of modern technology in the hospital, 
and the financial impact on the area on the hospital itself. The socioeconomic status of 
the area surrounding the hospital may be a confounding variable for the HAI hospital data 
and warrants future research. 
 
1.2.4 Research Question 
Does the safety cultural assessment survey, the HSOPS, measure HRO? 
 
1.2.5 Hypothesis Statement 
Coupling high reliability theory with hospital safety culture-related measures can provide 
predictors for patient safety outcomes. 
 
1.2.6 Societal Contribution 
The problem statement requires a translational continuum, the evolution of understanding the 
applications of HRO in healthcare, including the assessment of healthcare organizations’ safety-
related measures. The problem of increased HAIs requires hospital program evaluation, 
accountability, and improvement at all levels of the patient safety system. The public needs to 
hold hospitals responsible for the quality of services they provide. 
The research recommendations were developed by correlating an existing patient safety culture 
survey with the characteristics, principles, and theories of HROs. The Results section provides 
elements for the survey developers to consider when updating the HSOPS patient safety culture 
survey. The research recommendations can assist accrediting bodies such as the Joint 
Commission in ensuring that their requirements obtain the high reliability principles they endorse 
for hospital programs. Finally, the research recommendations allow hospital administrators who 
desire their units to become an HRO to perform self-assessments and identify areas for 
improvement in their journey to become an HRO. These three different areas—accrediting 
bodies, patient safety survey developers, and hospital administrators—are the target audiences 
for the following research. They all have patient safety at the core of their operations. 
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1.3 Dissertation Organization 
The following major sections of this dissertation are Literature Review; Materials and Methods; 
Results and Discussion; and Conclusion. The Literature Review presents an overview of HAIs 
and the patient safety culture in U.S. Hospitals. It highlights the seminal research on high 
reliability theory and its relevance to healthcare organizations. It also includes the use of patient 
safety surveys as the tools used to assess the hospital safety culture. Materials and Methods detail 
the methodology of the current research. The Research Validation confirms the method chosen in 
the current research. The Results and Discussions identify and discuss the proclivity of outcomes 
hospital administrators can expect from deploying the recommendations. The Conclusion 
provides a summary of the research question, hypothesis and the researched results as well as an 
opportunity for future work. 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The current research centers on hospitals’ patient safety culture and the deployment of effective 
process improvement tools that will enable hospitals to reach a mindset of safety comparable to 
HROs. The patient safety movement has placed HAIs under great “scrutiny by patients, 
providers, healthcare institutions, and regulatory agencies” (Yanke, Carayon, & Safdar, 2014, p. 
1176). The research supports the development of a self-assessment approach that hospital 
administrators can use to improve the avoiding infections outcome portion of their hospital 
safety score composite. Healthcare organizations need more than key principles and 
characteristics to transition to an HRO (Tolk et al., 2015). 
“There has been an increased awareness of and interest in patient safety and improved 
outcomes, as well as a growing body of evidence substantiating medical error as a 
leading cause of death and injury in the U.S. According to The Joint Commission, U.S. 
hospitals demonstrate improvements in health care quality and patient safety. Although 
this progress is encouraging, much room for improvement remains” (Wright, 2015, p. 1).  
In this vein, the translational approach developed through this research seeks to explore the 
discovery of HROs and their applications in healthcare. 
 
2.1 HRO Theory and HAIs 
Several databases were used to conduct the review of literature, including, Compendex, 
PsycINFO, PubMed, Scopus and Web of Science. The literature review began with a broad 
keyword search using the term “high reliability organizations” in the Scopus, Compendex, and 
PsycINFO databases. The purpose of the keyword search was to capture the seminal research on 
high reliability organizations. Particular attention was given to refereed journal articles. 
Scholarly books provided a foundation for HRO theory. Additional key terms in the literature 
search were Hospital-Associated Infections and Hospital Patient Safety. The patient safety 
searches excluded hospitals where the patients were not humans, i.e. veterinarian hospitals.  
Using One Search on the University of Tennessee Online Libraries, a key word search on High 
Reliability Organizations yielded 665 peer-reviewed journals. The number reduced to one peer 
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reviewed article when adding Hospital-Associated Infections to the query. Likewise, a key word 
search on Hospital-Associated Infections yielded more than fifteen thousand (15,717) peer 
reviewed journals; however, once adding High Reliability Organizations to this search, the peer-
reviewed journals reduced to the same article. After further investigation, it was discovered that 
the article found in the Official Journal of the International League Against Epilepsy was on 
neither topic. A similar basic search was performed in the Web of Science database using a 
wildcard character (*) to find plurals and word variants and using the topics separately by adding 
a field. The search found no records. An advanced search in PsycINFO, PubMed and Scopus was 
performed using the same key words and no records were found in either. Although a research 
paper exists linking HROs to infections in general, to date, no published research has been found 
linking HROs and HAIs specifically. 
 
2.2 HAIs and Patient Safety Culture in US Hospitals 
In response to patient safety concerns from the public, many states have adopted individual 
regulations for hospitals to report patient safety events (Weinberg, Hilborne, & Nguyen, 2005). 
The 2005 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, implemented by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), created a national database on medical errors and 
addressed patient safety issues. The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act does not affect 
state laws requiring hospitals to voluntarily report patient safety items, but encourages providers 
by creating an incentive to do so (Smith & Stratton, 2006). Not reporting the required 
information could be damaging to the hospital’s reputation, potentially cause the hospital to incur 
a financial penalty and possibly affect the state licenses of the practitioners involved. 
Patient safety is a concern of healthcare practitioners, hospital administrators, as well as the 
larger population—particularly patients and their families (Affare, Tolk, & Cantu, 2015). “To 
achieve the best outcomes, patients and families must be more actively engaged in decisions 
about their health care and must have broader access to information and support” (The Joint 
Commission, 2015, p. PS-15). An informed patient relies on consumer health reports such as 
patient safety ratings, which are found in Consumer Reports. HealthGrades (2015), a hospital 
rating company based in Golden, Colorado, suggested that consumers look for hospitals that are 
rated better than average in an effort to reduce their risk of experiencing adverse patient safety 
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events. “Patient safety performance data may be used in support of many efforts aimed at 
improving patient safety: regulators may use the data for accountability purposes such as 
licensure and certification programs…” (Aspden, Corrigen, Wolcott, & Erickson, 2004, p. 250). 
Of interest to this research are the policy changes in payments for Medicare patients acquiring 
HAIs and/or HAIs constituting hospital readmission. Effective, October 1, 2008, the CMS 
instituted a policy that requires hospitals to assume financial responsibility for HAIs (Stone et al., 
2010). “An additional estimated $103 million in payments would be withheld if Medicare 
expands the policy to include non-payment for [HAI] related readmissions” (McNair & Luft, 
2012, p. E1). Tools provided by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) such as tying hospital Medicare 
reimbursements to readmission rates are among the ACA’s aims and initiatives that led to the 
prevention of nearly 15,000 deaths in hospitals and prevented 560,000 patient harms in 2011 and 
2012 (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services [HHS], 2014). A revision to the national 
strategy for quality improvement in health care—Title III of the ACA (2015) calls for an 
adjustment in hospital medical payments based on the fates of HAIs. 
Participants in a CMS policy study involving 33 senior researchers with national expertise in 
HAIs and patient safety questioned whether financial incentives would influence clinical practice 
(Stone et al., 2010). The research revealed that financial incentives act as the motivator for 
“mindfulness” in patient safety. “In this adapted behavioral model of incentive serves as the 
stimulus while the environmental, organizational provider and patient characteristics present 
mediating variables, which affect the outcomes” (Stone et al., 2010, p. 435). “Public and private 
payers will hold providers increasingly accountable for costs and quality across the continuum 
and success will depend on hospitals’ ability to . . . achieve both greater efficiency and improved 
outcomes” (Health Forum, 2012, p. xiv). The concern is that, over time, the financial incentive 
becomes the norm and the expected behavior is soon forgotten. Furthermore, the policy was for 
Medicare payments and did not affect payments from non-Medicare insurance carriers; private-
pay insurance carriers were not included in the policy. 
Another tool offered by the ACA (2010) was the Partnership for Patients initiative. In April 
2011, the HHS (2014) joined hospital leaders, other health professionals, along with state and 
federal governments to launch the Partnership for Patients. One of the primary goals of this 
nationwide, public-private initiative was to reduce preventable hospital-acquired conditions by 
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40% (HHS, 2014). Among the preventable hospital-acquired conditions identified by the 
Partnership for Patients are the HAIs that are the subject of this research: CAUTIs, CLASBIs, 
and SSIs. These HAIs make up 30% of the initial focus for the Partnership for Patients’ 
identified patient safety areas (HHS, 2014). Preliminary data reported by two different hospital 
engagement networks, Health Association of New York and Dignity Health, showed a reduction 
in CAUTIs, CLABSIs, and SSIs from 2010 to 2013 (HHS, 2014). Although there are noted, 
historic improvements in patient harm in hospitals, there is more to do to improve patient safety 
(HHS, 2014). The Joint Commission, an agency that accredits more than 20,500 healthcare 
organizations in the United States, has “few proven tools or methods that can guide hospital 
leaders to achieve a fully functional patient safety culture” (Chassin & Loeb, 2013, p.469). 
The National Action Plan to Prevent Health Care-Associated Infections: Road Map to 
Elimination (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Office of Disease Prevention and 
Health Promotion, accessed August 30, 2015) produced a status report on the efforts of the five-
year healthcare-associated infection prevention goals which were developed as a result the HHS 
action plan in 2009. The national report found:  
 a 46% decrease in CLABSI between 2008 and 2013; 
 a 19% decrease in SSIs related to the 10 select procedures tracked in the report between 
2008 and 2013; and 
 a 6% increase in CAUTI between 2009 and 2013; although initial data from 2014 seem to 
indicate that these infections have started to decrease. 
The national report was based on 2013 data. “Despite progress, the nation did not reach the 2013 
goals. More action is needed at every level of public health and health care to improve patient 
safety and eliminate infections that commonly threaten hospital patients” (CDC, 2015, para. 9).  
 
2.3 High Reliability Organization Theory 
In his book, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies (1984), Yale sociologist, 
Charles Perrow, argued that the conventional engineering approach to ensuring safety-building in 
more warnings and safeguards-fails because systems complexity makes failures inevitable. He 
concluded that in highly complex organizations in which processes are tightly coupled, 
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catastrophic accidents are bound to happen. The April 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant in Ukraine suggested that society cannot wait to study after-action catastrophic 
events; it is too costly (Roberts and Rousseau, 1989). “This set the stage for a research group at 
the University of California at Berkeley to study organizations in which errors can have 
catastrophic consequences. The research group focused initially on organizations that seemed to 
behave very reliably, which they called high reliability organizations” (Roberts, 2003, p. 13). 
An Interview with Karlene Roberts (Bourrier, 2005) states Roberts’s definition of an HRO as an 
“organizations that can have catastrophic outcomes but which conduct relatively error free 
operations over long periods of time and make consistently good decisions that result in high 
quality and reliability operations” (p. 93). The original HRO research investigated processes in 
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy (Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987). The 
Federal Aviation Administration had HRO research performed on air traffic control operations 
(Schulman, 1993). Commercial aviation was the first to develop HRO-like principles after a 
deadly United Airlines accident in Portland in 1978 (Roberts, 2003). Industries such as nuclear 
power and air traffic control are highly regulated organizations with a very tight command and 
control structure within their operations. Other industries that became interested in HROs include 
firefighting, mining, and health care (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Healthcare is not considered as 
regulated as the previously mentioned industries. Early research defined the theory of HROs as 
embodying a minimum of eight primary characteristics that must occur simultaneously (Roberts 
& Rousseau, 1989): 
• Hyper complexity – having an variety of components, subsystems and organizational 
levels;  
• Tightly coupled systems – having non-sequential, time-dependent processes across 
multiple units or organizational levels; 
• Hierarchical differentiation – multiple organizational levels with individual regulations 
and controls; 
• Multiple decisions and immediate feedback – quick operational decisions and feedback 
on those decisions are imperative to the safe implementation of the decisions; 
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• Degree of accountability – severe consequences for poor performance or not following 
procedures; 
• Large amount of immediate feedback about decisions – duplicate information systems 
and redundant controls; 
• Compressed time factors – cycle time (measured in seconds); and 
• More than one critical outcome that must happen simultaneously – eliminate the 
ability to withdraw or modify complex operations. 
Another research group at the University of Michigan began addressing similar issues (e.g., 
Weick, 1987; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obsfeld, 1999). While this group represented different 
disciplines (psychology, political science and physics), they came together with an 
organizational perspective. “These researchers took a different perspective than most of those 
who preceded them” (Roberts, 2003, p. 13); they were initially concerned with understanding 
success in organizations in which errors can result in catastrophe (Roberts, 2003). “HROs have 
developed ways of acting [mindful] that provide a template for all organizations that want to be 
more reliable in managing the unexpected” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, inside jacket). Managing 
the Unexpected (2001) details the importance of and practical guidelines on how to manage 
unexpected events. After carefully studying organizations identified as HROs, the authors 
determined that good management of unexpected events requires a mindful approach (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001). Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) identified the following five key high reliability 
constructs, which are believed to be essential for any successful improvement initiatives: 
• “Sensitivity to operations. Preserving constant awareness by leaders and staff of the 
state of the systems and processes that affect patient care. This awareness is key to noting 
risks and preventing them. 
• Reluctance to simplify. Simple processes are good, but simplistic explanations for why 
things work or fail are risky. Avoiding overly simple explanations of failure (unqualified  
staff, inadequate training, communication failure, etc.) is essential in order to understand 
the true reasons patients are placed at risk. 
• Preoccupation with failure. When near-misses occur, these are viewed as evidence of 
systems that should be improved to reduce potential harm to patients. Rather than 
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viewing near-misses as proof that the system has effective safeguards, they are viewed as 
symptomatic of areas in need of more attention. 
• Deference to expertise. If leaders and supervisors are not willing to listen and respond to 
the insights of staff who know how processes really work and the risks patients really 
face, [the organization] will not have a culture in which high reliability is possible. 
• Commitment to Resilience. Leaders and staff need to be trained and prepared to know 
how to respond when system failures do occur” (Hines, et al., 2008, p. 1). 
“Research shows that HROs pursue two competing approaches to achieve reliable performance: 
the prevention (anticipation) approach and the resilience (containment) approach” (Sutcliffe, 
2011, p. 136). Categorically, the concepts are subdivided into two parts: principles of 
anticipation and principles of containment, as shown in Figure 1. Anticipation is waiting for 
something to occur, while containment is maintaining a level of support throughout adverse 
situations. An organization’s unique ability to prepare for and prevent the unexpected or recover 
quickly from failure while learning from both options is resilient- a concept clearly understood 
by high reliability organizations (Sutcliffe, 2011). 
 
2.4 Summary of HRO Theory in Healthcare 
Hospital emergency rooms were omitted from seminal HRO research efforts because they did 
not involve compressed time frames, simultaneous outcomes, and complex technologies that 
may lead to unpredictable results (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989). The healthcare industry became 
interested in HROs after the historical IOM (1999) report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer 
Health System. The 98,000 patient deaths due to hospital errors have increased in the last 10 
years due to HAIs (Yanke et al., 2014). James (2013) later suggested that the number ranges 
from 210,000 to 400,000 patient deaths annually. “HAIs are among the leading causes of death 
in the U.S.” (Yanke et al., 2014, p. 1176). 
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Figure 1: HRO Characteristics Subdivided 
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Tolk, Cantu, and Beruvides (2013) evaluated the healthcare industry related to HROs. They 
conducted a literature review and determined that the healthcare industry had not modified the 
initial theory of HROs, but instead concentrated on applying it. In a subsequent study, Tolk et al. 
(2013) conducted a literature review that showed the healthcare industry has the largest body of 
publications on applying HRO theory in practice. Although high-reliability science has greatly 
increased the understanding of how HROs function, it does not provide much practical insight 
into how organizations can move from low to high reliability (Blouin & McDonagh, 2011). “An 
industry that relies heavily on human performance, such as healthcare, can benefit from 
emulating an HRO by establishing human error-preventing methods” (Affare et al., 2015). 
Hospitals need a concise process for separating human errors from recklessness (The Joint 
Committee, 2015). Mindfulness focuses on and identifies possible errors while creating strategies 
to either mitigate the error or contain its impact (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). “A classical human 
factors engineering approach [would] establish a work environment that is designed to make safe 
behaviors intuitive and to prevent errors of omission by providing visual cues as reminders” (Sax 
& Clack, 2014, p. 338). Research into and management of organizational errors has its social 
science roots in human factors engineering. The human factors movement began during World 
War II and was aimed at both improving equipment design and maximizing human effectiveness. 
Massoumi (2015) argued, “Healthcare is a combination of multiple systems united . . . to serve 
the population. . . [Researching] human factors can identify safety, quality, and reliability 
challenges by understanding how humans interact [in] processes” (Massoumi, 2015, Abstract). 
Healthcare is an industry which humans are the process. With regard to the HAIs in this research, 
central line, urinary tract, and surgical site infections, they all involve heavy human interaction. 
Prevention of HAIs requires not only reliability, but high reliability 
 
2.5 HRO and Patient Safety Culture 
High-reliability concepts can help focus attention on the local mindset and patient safety culture 
that is essential for quality improvements (Hines et al., 2008). Safety culture refers to the 
enduring beliefs and practices of an organization and its willingness to apply lessons learned 
(Singer et al., 2009). Increasingly, hospitals are applying such lessons learned to address safety 
and health. While culture may be the foundation for organizational vision, safety must be the 
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overarching organizational strategy (Blouin & McDonagh, 2011). Americans have had trouble in 
the last half of century understanding the healthcare system and did not see it as putting patients 
first (HHS, 2014). Developing a culture of safety has become a core element of many efforts to 
improve patient safety (Hamdan, 2013). 
Since 2009, the Joint Commission has required the leadership of all healthcare organizations it 
accredits to “create and maintain a culture of safety” (Chassin & Loeb, 2013, p. 469). A strong 
safety culture is a healthcare’s central tenet to becoming an HRO (Singer et al., 2009). One 
component in valuing organizational learning is a focus on improving system performance 
(Institute of Medicine, 2004). “Patient safety climate, or culture, shapes expected behaviors 
related to patient safety” (Affare, et al., 2015) and is often measured by using a culture survey 
(Weaver et al., 2013). Given that the culture of safety influences the outcomes in patient care by 
shaping staff behavior, such surveys are widely being implemented (Weaver et al., 2013). 
Since 2011, patient safety has improved, “saving an estimated 50,000 lives and $12 billion 
dollars” (HHS, 2014). “Quality in health care is the degree to which [provider] processes and 
results meet or exceed the needs and desires of the people it serves” (The Joint Committee, 2015, 
p. PS-1). Consumers are now empowered with more available healthcare data. One of the 
platforms for becoming a highly reliable health care system is greater public accountability 
(Stokes, 2013). 
 
2.6 Healthcare Organizations and Patient Safety Surveys 
In 2004, AHRQ tested, revised and released the HSOPS. The HSOPS is a staff survey designed 
to help hospitals assess staff perceptions about the culture of safety (including patient safety 
issues, medical errors and event reporting) in their institutions. The survey measures 12 patient 
safety culture composites with 42 questions. Multiple regression analyses were performed to 
examine relationships between 15 safety culture variables and a measure based on patient safety 
indicators (PSIs) (Mardon, Khanna, Sorra, Dyer & Famolaro, 2010). “The AHRQ PSIs 
underwent validation through a clinical panel review process, which provided the basis for 
selecting the indicators expected to be most useful for screening potentially preventable adverse 
events” (Mardon et al., 2010, pp. 227-228). The findings of the limited research revealed a direct 
relationship between patient safety culture and adverse hospital events. Adverse events are those 
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that result in harm to a patient. The survey results provided validation of assessing the safety 
culture as an indicator of patient safety (Mardon, et al., 2010). 
The Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare Organizations (PSCHO) survey was developed by the 
Patient Safety Culture Institute at the Veteran Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System under the 
direction of Dr. David Gaba and Stanford University (Hartman et al., 2008; Singer et al., 2007). 
The PSCHO survey captures 38 safety climate items (Singer et al., 2007) and measures eight 
distinct dimensions of safety climate covering organizational, work-unit, and interpersonal 
contributions to a hospital’s overall safety climate (Singer et al., 2003). The PSCHO survey 
“exhibits strong psychometric properties, is optimized for hospital-wide implementation, [and] 
covers more topics with fewer items than other safety climate surveys” (Singer et al., 2007, p. 
24). The psychometric properties were tested by surveying personnel from 105 U.S. hospitals 
representing all disciplines and hierarchy levels (Singer et al., 2007). The data were analyzed 
using an exploratory factor and multi-trait analyses and several constructs; three organizational 
factors, two units, and three individual factors were identified (Singer et al., 2007). The 
constructs demonstrated the possibility of measuring key features of safety climate when using 
the appropriate sample size (Singer et al., 2007). A separate research using the 2004 PSCHO 
survey applied systematic sampling measuring patient safety climate in 92 U.S. hospitals (Singer 
et al., 2009). The results highlighted differences in attitudes and perceptions among work areas 
and within the emergency departments, which offered a better safety climate than other areas 
(Singer et al., 2009). 
Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems “(HCAHPS) is a national 
survey that asks patients about their experiences during a recent hospital stay” (Medicare.gov,  
assessed June 29, 2015). Such surveys are comparable to a customer restaurant rating or review 
of a hotel stay. Although HCAHPS, a federally mandated survey instrument, is a component of 
quality health care, the average patient experience is ubiquitous—either relying upon unmet 
patient expectations or a utopian hospital experience. An unfriendly admittance clerk, a nervous 
phlebotomist or a “dry” (nonchalant) physician can shape the entire patient experience (Kerfoot, 
2008). The volatility of such a survey, though potentially damaging to the hospital’s reputation, 
provides little evidence-based support and is of no interest to this research. 
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A commitment to safety at the highest level of the organization, as well as openness toward 
reporting errors, is of paramount importance (Institute of Medicine, 2004). The result of the HRO 
literature analysis by Tolk et al. (2014) found that, in essence, all of the journal articles that were 
based upon case studies of high-reliability cultures used a survey methodology to measure safety 
culture (Tolk et al., 2014). The authors reviewed “over 500 journal articles, books, essays, 
manuals, and conference papers” using the search term high-reliability organizations and key 
words relevant to healthcare and patient safety cultures to compare recommendations for 
managers of HROs against actual implementations (Tolk, Cantu & Beruvides, 2015, p. 222). 
While many hospitals conduct staff surveys to assess their safety culture, few have moved 
beyond tabulating survey results to take effective actions that have resulted in creating a patient 
safety culture supportive of high reliability (Chassin & Loeb, 2013). Moreover, surveys measure 
the employee’s perception of the local safety culture (Weaver et al., 2013) and other 
characteristics as provided by hospital personnel. 
 
2.7 Research Justification 
PSI are measures that identify preventable, adverse events. When a consumer seeks treatment at 
a hospital for one medical problem, they don’t want to experience an additional injury, infection, 
or serious condition during their stay. Patient safety ratings show consumers how well a hospital 
safeguards patients from serious, potentially preventable complications, such as infections and 
adverse events which can occur during their hospital stay. The problem of increased HAIs 
requires improvement at all levels of the patient safety system. 
In response to the Joint Commission’s requirement for hospitals to maintain a safety culture and 
the existing research gap in prescriptive steps to become an HRO, this research conducts 
correlations between high reliability constructs and an existing safety-related cultural assessment 
tool. Although twelve patient safety climate factors are presented in the HSOPS survey, it was 
developed to assess safety culture (Haugen et. al, 2010). Patient safety culture is determined by 
an organization’s management of and commitment to safety (Bonner, Castle, Perera, & Handler, 
2008). In this vein, the HSOPS responses will be used as a measurement of the staff’s perception 
of the safety culture in the responding hospitals. 
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There is no evidence stating that the AHRQ designed the HSOPS tool that is supportive of HRO 
theory. The Literature Review noted that the validation process of the survey included a clinical 
review panel which provided the most useful safety indicators to possibly screen adverse events. 
This research proposes that by coupling high reliability theory with the HSOPS tool, AHRQ will 
arm the end user with a stronger tool to assess their culture of safety and potentially improve 
their hospital infection outcome. 
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CHAPTER III  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
How does a hospital transition into an HRO? No universal method exists to help guide hospitals 
transitioning to an HRO. The literature review reveals how an industry outside of academia such 
as healthcare can value the characteristics of an HRO enough to justify organizational 
improvements toward becoming an HRO. The Literature Review documented the use of safety 
culture surveys as a valid representation of patient safety culture in hospitals. The HSOPS survey 
results represent an internal, hospital-specific safety culture assessment. Relational analyses will 
be used to test the existence of high-reliability theory in the hospital safety-related cultural 
assessment tool. In this vein, the HSOPS questions will be coded against all five HRO 
constructs. 
The research plan also involves analyzing the safety score data obtained from the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency of the Federal government. Works of the 
U.S. government are in the public domain and permission is not required to reuse them. The 
research collected information from publicly available sources and thus no patient consent was 
required. The data reported by CMS is reported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and 
then publically reported on CMS’s Hospital Compare website, hospitalcompare.hhs.gov. If CMS 
does not report data for one or more of the measures, it is because the hospital either did not have 
sufficient data or because there were discrepancies in data collection. 
 
3.1 Research Plan 
3.1.1 Coding Hospital Safety Culture Survey Questions Against HRO Constructs 
The methods used in the initial part of this research were designed to answer the research 
question, Does the safety cultural assessment survey, the HSOPS, measure HRO?  The 
correlation of high-reliability constructs and a hospital’s safety-related measure was difficult 
because the characteristics of an HRO are not quantitative measurements. Despite this challenge, 
a quantitative approach with qualitative elements was established. Qualitative data were readily 
available for the HRO constructs, the mindful assessment questions in Exhibits 4.5 to 4.9 of 
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Managing the Unexpected (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) found in Appendix 1. In this vein, the 
HSOPS culture survey was coded against high-reliability constructs using the mindfulness 
assessment questions as a guide. The coding was performed to transform qualitative data into 
quantitative data. Questions from the HSOPS survey were coded with a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 
corresponding to the numerical code assigned to the HRO constructs, as listed in Table 1. To 
reduce bias, the researcher obtained coding consensus with two fellow researchers; each coded 
individually then compared and discussed their results until consensus was reached. The HRO 
constructs correlated with 33 of the 42 survey questions (78.57%). A copy of the HSOPS survey 
is found in Appendix 2. 
 
 
Table 1: Coding for HRO Constructs 
 
Numerical Code Assigned HRO Construct 
1 Sensitivity to Operations 
2 Reluctance to Simplify 
3 Preoccupation with Failure 
4 Deference to Expertise 
5 Commitment to Resilience 
 
 
The primary work area or unit in the hospital; Sections: G (Number of Events Reported), H 
(Background Information) and I (Comments) were omitted from the coding as they did not 
provide questions that could be coded against HRO constructs. Some of these sections will be 
used later in the research discussion. Reverse coding was assigned to survey questions that 
would negatively correlate to the HRO constructs. An example is question number seven on the 
HSOPS which says We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. While 
being sensitive to operations does involve management monitoring workload and obtaining 
agency/temporary staff as needed, the best care for patients has to be the primary focus of any 
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operation. One hundred percent of the survey questions that were reverse coded in this research 
were also reverse coded in the 2014 HSOPS Comparative Database.  
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Figure 2: Summary of HSOPS Coding 
 
 
Table 2: HSOPS Coding Tally 
 
HRO Constructs Total Number of 
Correlated Questions 
Sensitivity to Operations 9 
Reluctance to Simplify 6 
Preoccupation with Failure 11 
Deference to Expertise 4 
Commitment to Resilience 3 
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Table 3 shows the results of the coding consensus per HSOPS question. The green shaded areas 
are questions coded with the HRO constructs that are listed as the column titles. Approximately 
twenty-one percent (21.43%) of the survey questions did not correlate with HRO constructs. The 
middle of Figure 3 shows the grouped or clustered questions coded to each HRO construct. The 
first three constructs (rectangular boxes) are Principles of Anticipation and the last two are 
Principles of Containment. On the right side of Figure 3, we see the sections of the survey and 
the HRO construct gaps in each section. For example, none of the questions in Section A (Your 
Work Area/ Unit) were coded to the Deference to Expertise construct. The left side of Figure 3 
rank orders the HRO constructs as a result of the HRO coding. 
 
 
3.1.2 Assigning a HRO Score 
The HSOPS responses from 612 unidentified U.S. hospitals were obtained from Westat. The 
HSOPS data used in this analysis was provided by the HSOPS Comparative Database. The 
HSPOS Comparative Database is funded by AHRQ and administered by Westat under contract 
with AHRQ. The complete file obtained from Westat is uploaded into the Tennessee Research 
and Creative Exchange (TRACE) as Attachment 1, HSOPS Responses Data File, along with the 
Code Book for HSOPS Response, Attachment 2. The Comparative Database Report provides 
initial results to hospitals so that they can use to the results to compare their patient safety culture 
to other US hospitals (AHRQ, 2014).  
The coding consensus confirmed a relationship between the HRO constructs and the HSOPS 
survey. In order to assess the existing relationship against hospital infection outcomes, a HRO 
Scoring System was created using the questions clustered for each of the HRO constructs as 
coded previously. The percent positive HSOPS responses greater than or equal to 0.5 were given 
a 1 and the rest were 0. The positive responses are said to be actionable data because they are 
reported to the hospitals and used by Westat for national benchmarks (S. Smith, personal 
communication, September 15, 2015). 
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Table 3: Coding Consensus Result 
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Figure 3: Results of the HRO Constructs Coding 
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The HSOPS survey had 380,612 valid (positive and negative) responses. By totaling the number 
of positive responses per hospital, the researcher was able to calculate an HRO Score for each of 
the 612 hospitals. The results of the HRO Scoring System are found in Appendix 3. Table 4 
shows the total number positive responses from the 612 hospital survey responses and the weight 
of each construct on the HRO Score. The average HRO score for all of the 612 hospitals was 
25.97 with a standard deviation of 3.825. Figure 4 is a histogram of the HRO scores. 
 
 
Table 4: HRO Percentages by Construct 
 
HRO Constructs Positive Responses Percent 
Sensitivity to Operations (S2O) 4190 26.36% 
Reluctance to Simplify (R2S) 2849 17.92% 
Preoccupation with Failure (PwF) 5024 31.61% 
Deference to Expertise (D2E) 2042 12.85% 
Commitment to Resilience (C2R) 1790 11.26% 
Total 15895 100% 
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Figure 4: Histogram of HRO Scores 
 
 
3.1.3 HAI Safety Score Information 
The HAI data used in this research was downloaded from the Hospital Compare database,  
(hospitalcompare.hhs.gov) during the months of January through March 2015. The HAI raw data 
file for 2013 contained 166,284 lines of data and was uploaded as Attachment 1. The raw data 
collected from the Hospital Compare database were filtered to reveal the HAIs (with measure 
IDs) specific to this research: CLASBI (HAI_1_SIR), CAUTI (HAI_2_SIR), and SSI from colon 
surgery (HAI_3_SIR). The SSI data are collected for hysterectomy and colon surgery. In order to 
reduce gender bias, this research chose SSIs from colon surgery only. The sample obtained for 
this part of the research was 2,411 hospitals. Figures 5, 6, and 7 are histograms of the HAI 
CLABSI, CAUTI, and SSI scores, respectively. The average safety composite score for CLABSI 
is 0.51, 1.14 for CAUTI, and 0.90 for SSI. 
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Figure 5: Histogram of CLABSI Scores 
32 
 
 
Figure 6: Histogram of CAUTI Scores 
 
33 
 
 
Figure 7: Histogram of SSI (colon) Scores 
 
 
3.1.5 Analyzing the Two Datasets 
The average HRO Score and its standard deviation per region are found in Table 5 along with a 
distribution of hospitals participating in the HSOPS by region. The New England and Mid-
Atlantic regions were combined in the HSOPS data set and are therefore combined in Table 5.  
The Mountain and Pacific regions were also combined in the HSOPS data set and are therefore 
combined in Table 5. The means found in Table 5 show that the combined New England/ Mid-
Atlantic Region has the lower average HRO scores compared to hospitals in the East South 
Central Region, which show the highest average HRO score. The average HRO score for 
government-controlled hospitals is 26.20 and the average HRO score for non-government 
hospitals is 25.93. The average HRO score for teaching hospitals is 24.66 and the average HRO 
score for non-teaching hospitals is 26.68. 
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Table 5: Distribution of Hospitals by Region 
 
 
Region 
Participating Hospitals 
HSOPS 
Mean HRO 
Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
   N %    
1 New England/Mid-Atlantic 93 15% 23.69 3.612 
3 South Atlantic 121 20% 26.96 3.677 
4 E. North Central 161 26% 25.70 3.432 
5 E. South Central 52 8% 27.83 3.777 
6 W. North Central 46 8% 27.00 4.000 
7 W. South Central 65 11% 26.29 3.413 
9 Mountain/Pacific 74 12% 25.61 4.020 
 
Total 612 100% 25.97 3.825 
 
 
Table 6: Distribution of HAIs by Region 
 
 
Region Number of Hospitals Reporting Each Score in 2013 
   N CLABSI CAUTI SSI 
1 New England/Mid-Atlantic 417 224 92 101 
3 South Atlantic 470 218 126 126 
4 E. North Central 419 215 101 103 
5 E. South Central 181 66 58 57 
6 W. North Central 132 67 23 42 
7 W. South Central 297 244 86 66 
9 Mountain/Pacific 495 277 100 118 
 
Total 2411 1311 586 613 
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Table 7 provides a distribution of hospitals by size (number of staff beds) for both datasets. The 
average HRO Score per BSC is also found in Table 7. An inverse relationship is seen between 
the number of staffed beds in the participating hospitals and the average HRO scores. The means 
found in Table 7 show that the overall largest hospitals have the lower average HRO scores 
compared to the overall smallest hospitals which show the highest average HRO score. 
 
 
Table 7: Distribution of Hospitals by Size 
 
BSC 
Number of 
Staff Beds 
Participating Hospitals 
in HSOPS Responses 
Mean HRO 
Score 
Participating Hospitals 
HAI Scores 
 
  N %   n % 
2 6-49 beds* 33 15.8% 27.91 49 2.03% 
3 50-99 beds 88 14.4% 27.21 269 11.16% 
4 100-199 beds 96 15.7% 26.09 768 31.85% 
5 200-299 beds 140 22.9% 25.18 535 22.19% 
6 300-399 beds 93 15.2% 24.63 315 13.07% 
7 400-499 beds 63 10.3% 24.17 171 7.09% 
8 500+  beds 35 5.7% 23.66 281 11.66% 
 
Total 612 100% 25.97 2388 99.05% 
*Bed Size Code (BSC) 1 and 2 were combined for the hospital size as there were only 4 
hospitals with less than 25 beds in the dataset. 
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To compare the means in the datasets across control type and teaching status, the Student’s T-test 
and the Mann-Whitney U test, which is the nonparametric equivalent to the T test, were used. 
The Student’s T-test is also an appropriate tool to use with numerical values as those found in 
both the control type and teaching status of the hospital. “The Mann-Whitney test is a non-
parametric test that allows two groups . . . to be compared without making the assumption that 
values are normally distributed” (Stangroom, accessed November 17, 2015, para. 1). The two 
groups being compared are the control type and the teaching status. The independent results of 
each of these tests are found in Appendix 5. 
 
3.1.4 Common Elements 
The common elements in both sets of data, the HSOPS survey results and the HAI safety scores, 
were the Region, Hospital Size which is indicated by Number of Staff Beds, whether the hospital 
is government or non-government controlled and the teaching status of the hospital. Armed with 
this information, the researcher created a Hospital Type, RHGT, using the four common 
elements in each data set: Region (7 options), Hospital Size (8 options), Government (2 options), 
and Teaching (2 options). The result was a dataset with 121 observations where each observation 
is a type of hospital that obtained data in the common elements from both data sets. Twenty-
three hospitals (0.95%) from the HAI data set did not provide these four common elements. 
For each Hospital Type, the mean for the HRO scores and the mean of the three measures of the 
HAI scores were presented and are found in Appendix 4. The bed size, control type and teaching 
status data was obtained from the American Hospital Directory, www.ahd.com. The numerical 
values assigned for the control type were either 1 for government-controlled hospitals and 0 for 
non-government. Government-controlled hospitals may be under the authority of the city, 
county, or state government. There were a total of 309 (12.82%) government-controlled hospitals 
in the HAI data set and 99 (16.2%) government-controlled hospitals in the HSOPS responses. 
Likewise, the numerical value assigned for the hospital’s teaching status was either 1 for 
teaching hospitals and 0 for non-teaching hospitals. There were a total of 1,330 teaching 
hospitals in the HAI data set and 215 (35.1%) teaching hospitals in the HSOPS responses. 
Teaching hospitals includes hospitals that are actively involved as major participant in the 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education specialty and subspecialty programs. 
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Figure 8 is a histogram of the aggregated HRO Scores. Figures 9, 10 and 11 are histograms of 
the aggregated CLABSI, CAUTI and SSI Scores, respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Histogram of Aggregated HRO Data 
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Figure 9: Histogram of Aggregated CLABSI Data 
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Figure 10: Histogram of Aggregated CAUTI Data 
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Figure 11: Histogram of Aggregated SSI Data 
 
 
The histograms show that by taking the means, the distributions resemble more of a normal 
distribution compared to the distribution of the original HAI scores (before aggregating data). 
Nevertheless, non-parametric correlations will be used to assess the relationship of the HRO 
score with each of the HAI scores. The non-parametric correlations include the Spearman’s Rho 
and the Pearson Correlation Coefficient. These methods were selected because of the various 
sizes of the two datasets with the four common elements. “Spearman's Rho is a non-parametric 
test used to measure the strength of association between two variables, where the value r = 1 
means a perfect positive correlation and the value r = -1 means a perfect negative correlation” 
(Stangroom, accessed November 17, 2015, para. 1). The summary of the results will be 
presented in Chapter 4. 
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3.2 Research Validation 
The analyses performed in this research rely heavily on the coded results of the HRO constructs 
against the HSOPS survey questions. In this vein, a correlation analysis was performed to 
validate the HSOPS questions that were grouped or clustered as a result of the coding consensus. 
The correlations were performed the using the student MATLAB version R2014a software 
package. A data matrix (XD) was established using the hospital responses for each of the 612 
hospitals and the percent positive responses for the 42 coded questions from the survey. The data 
matrix has the dimension 42 x 612. The covariance matrix, S, of the data sample is  
S =   XD          (3.1) 
where T is the transpose of the matrix, XD (Martinez, Martinez, & Solka, 2011). From the 
covariance matrix, the correlation coefficients between each pair of the questions were obtained 
using the MATLAB corrcoef() function. The value of the correlation coefficient should be 
between -1 and 1, where zero means that there is absolutely no correlation; the two questions are 
totally independent. A correlation coefficient of 1 means the observations (questions) is the 
same, and a -1 means that there is a negative correlation; the responses are reverse. The 
corrcoef() function “includes matrices containing lower and upper bounds for a 95% confidence 
interval for each coefficient” (MathWorks, accessed October 15, 2015, para. 4). 
The response set of each hospital was considered as one observation. Tables 8 show snapshots of 
the correlation coefficients. For example, Table 3 and Figure 3 show that questions A1, A6 and 
A10 were all coded to the HRO construct Commitment to Resilience. The MATLAB Coefficient 
Table in Attachment 3 contains the entire file. The correlation coefficients are found by selecting 
one of the questions on the X axis and the other on the Y axis or vice versa in the coefficient 
matrix. 
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Table 8: Snapshots of the Covariance Coefficients 
 
 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
A1 1 0.47987 0.892319 0.888479 0.413537 0.412711 0.463373 0.561588 0.370584 0.465328 
A2 0.47987 1 0.554966 0.492184 0.605391 0.520667 0.459743 0.598129 0.534085 0.668788 
A3 0.892319 0.554966 1 0.82594 0.520061 0.454212 0.553343 0.597942 0.402072 0.558959 
A4 0.888479 0.492184 0.82594 1 0.40971 0.448103 0.384744 0.587233 0.42329 0.481791 
A5 0.413537 0.605391 0.520061 0.40971 1 0.416704 0.584739 0.583933 0.396998 0.668493 
A6 0.412711 0.520667 0.454212 0.448103 0.416704 1 0.382346 0.501497 0.720934 0.648516 
A7 0.463373 0.459743 0.553343 0.384744 0.584739 0.382346 1 0.502062 0.344609 0.585471 
A8 0.561588 0.598129 0.597942 0.587233 0.583933 0.501497 0.502062 1 0.604113 0.712913 
A9 0.370584 0.534085 0.402072 0.42329 0.396998 0.720934 0.344609 0.604113 1 0.635306 
A10 0.465328 0.668788 0.558959 0.481791 0.668493 0.648516 0.585471 0.712913 0.635306 1 
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Table 8: Snapshot of the Covariance Coefficients (continued) 
 
 
B1 B2 B3 B4 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
B1 1 0.856819 0.597288 0.579022 0.71692 0.656562 0.585679 0.668944 0.649777 0.646337 
B2 0.856819 1 0.745075 0.722903 0.72529 0.745782 0.550519 0.692936 0.719466 0.745166 
B3 0.597288 0.745075 1 0.815959 0.526094 0.650748 0.448506 0.527812 0.609021 0.671216 
B4 0.579022 0.722903 0.815959 1 0.513942 0.623573 0.411573 0.452286 0.569536 0.648298 
C1 0.71692 0.72529 0.526094 0.513942 1 0.70396 0.775218 0.69568 0.828822 0.589911 
C2 0.656562 0.745782 0.650748 0.623573 0.70396 1 0.591495 0.742193 0.741395 0.77656 
C3 0.585679 0.550519 0.448506 0.411573 0.775218 0.591495 1 0.603026 0.798511 0.48723 
C4 0.668944 0.692936 0.527812 0.452286 0.69568 0.742193 0.603026 1 0.6611 0.703995 
C5 0.649777 0.719466 0.609021 0.569536 0.828822 0.741395 0.798511 0.6611 1 0.636444 
C6 0.646337 0.745166 0.671216 0.648298 0.589911 0.77656 0.48723 0.703995 0.636444 1 
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As shown in the yellow and blue highlights in Table 8, the response is the same, no matter which 
of the two questions you select first. Table 8 shows a correlation coefficient of 0.412711 between 
question A1 and question A6, a correlation coefficient of 0.465328 between question A1 and 
question A10, and the correlation coefficient between question A6 and question A10 is 
0.648516. The correlation coefficients not seen in the snapshots of covariance coefficients in 
Table 8 are found in some of the Deference to Expertise questions, B1, B2, F2 and F6; and the 
Sensitivity to Operations and Preoccupation with Failure questions. Table 8 shows a correlation 
of 0.856819 between B1 and B2, but the correlation between the remaining pairs are not shown. 
The correlation between B1 and F2 is 0.602162 and the correlation between B2 and F2 is 
0.640409. The correlation between B1 and F6 is 0.519655 and the correlation between B2 and 
F6 is 0.573063. Finally, the correlation between F2 and F6 is 0.848038. The corresponding 
questions coded against each HRO construct as shown in Figure 3 all positively correlate with 
the questions they were grouped. Table 9 shows the correlation coefficients for the HRO 
construct, Sensitivity to Operations, questions. The remaining correlation coefficients for each 
pairs are found in Tables A.1 and A.2 for Reluctance to Simplify and Preoccupation with Failure, 
respectively. 
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Table 9: Coefficients for Questions Coded to Sensitivity to Operations  
 
X-Axis Y-Axis Coefficient 
  
X-Axis Y-Axis Coefficient 
A2 A5 0.605391 A14 B3 0.792797 
A2 A7 0.459743 A14 C1 0.57745 
A2 A14 0.823387 A14 F1 0.736047 
A2 B3 0.63883 A14 F8 0.688638 
A2 C1 0.462973 A14 F11 0.691514 
A2 F1 0.709164     
 A2 F8 0.608224 B3 C1 0.526094 
A2 F11 0.57724 B3 F1 0.692462 
    
 
B3 F8 0.652236 
A5 A7 0.584739 B3 F11 0.602528 
A5 A14 0.706673     
 A5 B3 0.59332 C1 F1 0.627891 
A5 C1 0.378197 C1 F8 0.66571 
A5 F1 0.437231 C1 F11 0.52217 
A5 F8 0.388048     
 A5 F11 0.508786 F1 F8 0.897979 
    
 
F1 F11 0.647881 
A7 A14 0.545886     
 A7 B3 0.457924 F8 F11 0.661128 
A7 C1 0.335819     
 A7 F1 0.340791     
 A7 F8 0.299602     
 A7 F11 0.384912     
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CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
What would a hospital administrator do if he or she were given the responsibility to assess their 
organization’s safety culture and develop ways to improve their hospital infection outcome? The 
literature review noted a direct relationship between patient safety culture and adverse hospital 
events; indicating that an improved safety culture reduces the number of adverse hospital events. 
High reliability concepts help focus attention on the mindset and safety culture that is essential 
for quality improvement (Hines et al., 2008). Deploying effective process improvement tools can 
enable hospitals to reach a safety standard comparable to HROs. Embedding high-reliability 
principles in a healthcare organization is a proven way to meet the demands of higher-quality 
expectations. The results of this research are discussed herein. 
 
4.1 Results 
4.1.1 Hypothesis Testing Methods 
The Kruskal Wallis test was used to determine the significant difference in the HRO Score and 
the region and hospital size. The Mann-Whitney U was used to determine the significant 
difference in HRO Score and the control type and teaching status of the hospitals. The p-values 
range between 0 and 1, and the values closest to 0 are more significant (MathWorks, accessed 
October 17, 2015). If the p-value “is smaller than the significance level (default is 0.05), then the 
corresponding correlation is considered significant” (MathWorks, accessed October 15, 2015, 
para. 3). 
 
4.1.2 ANOVA Results 
An independent, one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was run for each HAI score against 
the region and hospital size. The ANOVA output for the region is found in Table 10. The 
descriptive results for each region are found in Table A.11. The numbers indicating the region in 
Table A.11 correspond to the regions as they are listed in both datasets. The ANOVA results 
show that there are significant differences in CAUTI and SSI scores across hospitals in different 
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regions, (p = 0.001 and p = 0.000). The descriptive outputs show the average HAI Score for each 
region. The East North Central region had the lowest average CLABSI score, (0.4711); the West 
South Central region had the lowest average CAUTI Score, (0.9189) and the East South Central 
had the lowest average SSI score, (0.6765). On the contrary, the East South Central had the 
highest average CLASBI score (0.5980) and the combined New England/Mid-Atlantic region 
had the highest average CAUTI Score, (1.1911), and the highest average SSI score, (1.0672). 
 
 
Table 10: HAI ANOVA for Hospitals by Region 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CLABSI 
Between Groups 2.406 6 .401 1.572 .151 
Within Groups 503.493 1974 .255   
Total 505.899 1980    
CAUTI 
Between Groups 18.580 6 3.097 3.685 .001 
Within Groups 1890.702 2250 .840   
Total 1909.282 2256    
SSI 
Between Groups 23.895 6 3.983 6.311 .000 
Within Groups 1279.703 2028 .631   
Total 1303.599 2034    
 
 
The ANOVA output for HAI scores by bed size are found in Table 11. The descriptive results 
are found in Table A.12. The descriptive outputs show the average HAI Score for each BSC. The 
numbers for BSC in Table A.12 correspond to the bed sizes as they are listed in both datasets. 
Again, the ANOVA results show that there are significant differences in CAUTI and SSI scores 
across hospitals with different bed size, (p = 0.000 and p = 0.002). The means found in Table 
A.15 suggests that the hospitals with larger bed size have larger CAUTI scores. The same is 
suggested for SSI with the exemption of the smallest hospitals which has the largest HAI score 
for SSI. 
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Table 11: HAI ANOVA for Hospitals by Size 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CLABSI 
Between Groups 1.428 6 .238 .926 .475 
Within Groups 497.587 1936 .257   
Total 499.015 1942    
CAUTI 
Between Groups 98.260 6 16.377 20.347 .000 
Within Groups 1798.902 2235 .805   
Total 1897.162 2241    
SSI 
Between Groups 12.305 6 2.051 3.445 .002 
Within Groups 1116.341 1875 .595   
Total 1128.646 1881    
 
 
4.1.3 Kruskal Wallis Test Results 
Because the ANOVA is sensitive to deviations from normality and the distribution shown in the 
histograms found in Chapter 3 were not normal, a non-parametric equivalent, the Kruskal Wallis 
was performed. The p-values (asymptotic significance) shown in Table 12 provide a test of the 
significance in HAI scores in regions and the HRO Score result by region. The HRO Score and 
hospital infection rate, HAI composite score, were the dependent variables and the regions are 
the grouped independent variables. 
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Table 12: Kruskal Wallis Test Results Summary by Region 
 
 
Chi-Square 
df Asymptotic 
Significance 
HRO Score 61.872 6 0.000 
CLABSI 13.872 6 0.031 
CAUTI 27.046 6 0.000 
SSI 32.613 6 0.000 
 
 
The Kruskal Wallis results in Table 12 show that there are significant differences in HRO scores 
across hospitals in different regions (Chi-square = 61.872, p = 0.000). The Kruskal Wallis test 
results also indicate that there are significant differences in HAI scores in hospitals from 
different regions for all HAI scores. The Kruskal Wallis results in Table 13 show that there are 
significant differences in HRO scores across hospitals of different sizes. There are also 
significant differences in hospitals of all sizes and all three HAI scores. 
 
 
Table 13: Kruskal Wallis Test Results Summary by Hospital Size 
 
 
Chi-Square 
df Asymptotic 
Significance 
HRO Score 92.8111 7 0.000 
CLABSI 21.963 6 0.001 
CAUTI 230.571 6 0.000 
SSI 44.940 6 0.000 
 
 
4.1.4 Mann-Whitney U Results 
The results of the Mann-Whitney U for correlating the three HAI scores and the government-
controlled hospitals are found in Table 14. The Mann-Whitney U results show that there are no 
significant differences between the hospital control type for any of the three HAI composite 
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scores, (p = 0.059, p = 0.073, p = 0.316) nor the HRO Score, (p = 0.534). These findings are 
consistent with the Student T-test, which also finds that there are no significant differences in the 
hospital control type for any of the three HAI composite scores, (p = 0.278, p = 0.123, p = 
0.087). The Student T-test results in Table A.13. The Group Statistic provided the average HAI 
composite scores for government controlled hospitals as 0.5529 for CLABSI, 1.1123 for CAUTI 
and 0.9850 for SSI. 
 
Table 14: Mann-Whitney U Test Results Summary by Control Type 
 
 CLABSI CAUTI SSI HRO Score 
Mann-Whitney U 188784.500 266237.500 215343.500 24395.000 
Wilcoxon W 1686099.500 2168462.500 1772073.500 156236.000 
Z -1.887 -1.794 -1.004 -.622 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .059 .073 .316 .534 
a. Grouping Variable: Gov 
 
 
 
The results of the Mann-Whitney-U for correlating the three HAI scores and the hospital’s 
teaching status are found in Table 15. The Group Statistic provided the average HAI composite 
scores for teaching hospitals as 0.5043 for CLABSI, 1.1346 for CAUTI and 0.9541 for SSI. 
There are statistically significant differences between teaching and non-teaching hospitals for 
CAUTI and SSI measures. These findings are consistent with the Student T-test, which also finds 
significant differences for CAUTI and SSI Scores. The results of the Student T-test for 
correlating the three HAI scores and the hospital’s teaching status are found in Table A.14. 
Additionally, non-teaching hospitals have larger average HRO scores compared to teaching 
hospitals.  
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Table 15: Mann-Whitney U Test Results Summary by Teaching Status 
 
 CLABSI CAUTI SSI HRO Score 
Mann-Whitney U 443895.500 486832.500 432573.500 29337.500 
Wilcoxon W 718065.500 947152.500 758601.500 52557.500 
Z -.802 -8.486 -4.416 -6.409 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .423 .000 .000 .000 
a. Grouping Variable: Teaching 
 
 
 
4.1.5 Analyzing the Common Elements in Both Data Sets 
In order to analyze the relationship between the two scores, the HRO Score and HAI composite 
scores, the data was aggregated based on the common elements in both data sets. The previous 
two subsections in Chapter 4 have demonstrated the statistical significance in the four common 
elements in each data set, separately. Though the hospital’s control type had no significant 
difference on either dataset, conservatively, the control type remains in the analysis of the 
common elements because the data was included in the aggregation. The aggregated data for the 
HRO Score and the aggregated data for each of the hospital infection score composites were 
entered into a Spearman’s Rho Correlation Calculator. The Spearman’s Rho Correlation output 
is found in Table 16. 
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Table 16: Spearman’s Rho Correlation Results 
 
 (mean) 
CLABSI 
(mean) 
CAUTI 
(mean)  
SSI 
(mean) 
HRO Score 
(mean) 
CLABSI 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .190* .061 .178 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .047 .527 .062 
N 110 110 109 110 
(mean) 
CAUTI 
Correlation Coefficient  1.000 .261** -.311** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .047 . .005 .001 
N 110 117 114 117 
(mean) 
SSI 
Correlation Coefficient .178 .261** 1.000 -.103 
Sig. (2-tailed) .527 .005 . .265 
N 109 114 118 118 
(mean) Correlation Coefficient .178 -.311** -.103 1.000 
HRO Score Sig. (2-tailed) .062 .001 .265 . 
 N 110 117 118 121 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
The only significant correlation as shown in the results in Table 16 is the negative correlation 
between the HRO Score and CAUTI, (r = -0.311 and p = 0.001). The scatter plot in Figure 12 is 
provided as a further visual of the relationship between the HRO Score and CAUTI. CAUTI is 
the dependent variable and the HRO Score is the independent variable. There is a clear outlier. 
After revisiting the data, this outlier corresponds to BSC 1. 
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Figure 12. Scatter Plot of CAUTI vs. HRO Score 
 
 
As a result, BSC 1 was removed from the data set. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient was used 
to measures the strength of a linear relationship between the HRO Score and CAUTI. The result 
of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient is found in Table 17. Figure 13 is the scatter plot of the 
HRO Score and CAUTI with the outlier removed and the adjusted simple regression line added. 
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Table 17: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Results 
 
 (mean) 
CAUTI 
(mean) 
HRO Score 
(mean) 
CAUTI 
Pearson Correlation 1. -.338** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 116 116 
(mean) 
HRO Score 
Pearson Correlation -.338** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 116 116 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Updated Scatter Plot of CAUTI vs. HRO Score with Regression Line 
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The adjusted simple regression line shows a negative linear relationship between the HRO Score 
and the CAUTI score. The regression equation is 
CAUTI = 2.19 – 0.05x         (4.1) 
where x = average HRO score. The R-squared (R2) = 11.5% is low and suggests that this linear 
relationship is weak. An Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA), a combined regression and 
ANOVA, was performed to determine the predictors for CAUTI, if any. The CAUTI score was 
the dependent variable and the HRO Score was the covariate and the four common elements, 
RHGT, were added as factors. The results of the ANCOVA are found in Table 18. 
 
 
Table 18: ANCOVA for CAUTI by Common Elements 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 9.847a 15 .656 7.509 .000 
Intercept .731 1 .731 8.362 .005 
Region 1.153 6 .192 2.198 .049 
Hospital Size 5.658 6 .943 10.787 .000 
Control Type  .004 1 .004 0.44 .834 
Teaching Status .009 1 .009 .104 .748 
HRO Score .003 1 .003 .031 .861 
Error 8.742 100 .087   
Total 131.846 116    
Corrected Total 18.589 115    
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The predictors that emerged as a result of the ANCOVA are Region and Hospital Size. 
Particularly, the hospital size is the most significant predictor for catheter-associated urinary tract 
infections. The researcher reviewed the estimated marginal means for both Region and Hospital 
Size to understand and discuss the differences. Tables 19 and 20 show the results of the 
estimated marginal means for Region and Hospital Size, respectively. The average CAUTI score 
was the dependent variable for each. The regions associated with the largest CAUTI scores are 
the combined New England/ Mid-Atlantic region, the South Atlantic and the West North Central 
regions. On the other hand, East North Central shows the smallest CAUTI average score. Larger 
hospitals are also associated with larger CAUTI scores. 
 
 
Table 19: Estimated Marginal Means for Region 
 
Region Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
New England/Mid-Atlantic 1.120a .083 .954 1.285 
South Atlantic 1.044a .076 .894 1.195 
E. North Central .796a .075 .647 .944 
E. South Central .875a .085 .707 1.044 
W. North Central 1.041a .083 .876 1.206 
W. South Central .899a .071 .757 1.041 
Mountain/Pacific .998a .066 .867 1.129 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
(mean) HRO_Score = 25.5473. 
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Table 20: Estimated Marginal Means for Hospital Size 
 
Number of Staff 
Beds Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
6-49 beds .656a .112 .434 .879 
50-99 beds .549a .077 .396 .701 
100-199 beds .831a .066 .699 .962 
200-299 beds 1.120a .068 .985 1.254 
300-399 beds 1.101a .070 .962 1.240 
400-499 beds 1.301a .081 1.141 1.462 
500+  beds 1.215a .082 1.053 1.377 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: (mean) HRO_Score = 25.5473. 
 
 
4.1.6 Hypothesis Testing for the Common Elements in Both Data Sets 
Hypothesis Statement: Coupling high reliability theory with hospital safety culture-related 
measures can provide predictors for patient safety outcomes. 
Hypothesis1: H0: There is no significant correlation in CLABSI rates and HRO scores. 
Hypothesis1: Ha: There is a significant correlation in CLABSI rates and HRO scores. 
Hypothesis2: H0: There is no significant correlation in CAUTI rates and HRO scores. 
Hypothesis2: Ha: There is a significant correlation in CAUTI rates and HRO scores. 
Hypothesis3: H0: There is no significant correlation in SSI (colon) rates and HRO scores. 
Hypothesis3: Ha: There is a significant correlation in SSI (colon) rates and HRO scores. 
Test: α (alpha) = 0.05 
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Table 21 shows a summary of the relationship between the two scores, the HRO Score and each 
of the HAI composite scores. The null hypothesis, H0, is rejected for any HAI score with an 
alpha or p-value (yellow) < 0.05. H0 is rejected for CAUTI. 
 
 
Table 21: Combined Analytical Results 
 
HRO vs Chi-Square 
Spearman Rho 
p-value Decision 
CLABSI 21.963 .062 Fail to Reject H0 
CAUTI 230.571 .001 Reject H0 
SSI 44.940 .265 Fail to Reject H0 
 
 
4.2 Discussion 
In early 2000, the Joint Commission set a goal for hospitals to learn about and emulate HROs. 
As discovered from the Literature Review, high reliability concepts can help hospitals focus 
attention on a mindful patient safety culture, which is the central tenet to becoming an HRO. The 
research first examined the correlation between a hospital safety-related measure, the HSOPS, 
and HRO constructs. The coded HRO constructs against the hospital patient safety culture survey 
represents the existence of high reliability theory in the safety-related culture measure. High 
reliability theory is present in 78.57% of the patient safety culture surveys questions.  
Next, the researched assigned an HRO Score to the 612 unidentified U.S. hospitals using the 
percent positive HSOPS responses obtained from each. The HAI data downloaded from the 
Hospital Compare database provided a method for testing the hypothesis. Both datasets were 
aggregated and analyzed for predictors in coupling high reliability theory with hospital safety 
culture-related measures. The research recommendations are based on the lessons learned from 
the analyses herein. 
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By coupling high reliability theory with hospital safety culture-related measures, hospital 
administrators can provide predictors for their CAUTI outcomes. Based on the findings herein, it 
is recommended that hospitals with bed sizes greater than 500 beds perform a self-assessment on 
their mindfulness using the assessment questions found in Exhibits 4.5 to 4.9 of Managing the 
Unexpected (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). It is also recommended that the hospital administrators 
administer the HSOPS and obtain a copy of the Comparative Data Analysis from AHRQ. 
The coding of the HRO constructs and the safety related measure, HSOPS, is listed in Tables 2 
and 3 of this document. The least present HRO constructs in the HSOPS coding are Deference to 
Expertise and Commitment to Resilience. Deference to Expertise represents less than 10% of the 
HSOPS questions. Other uses for the information provided herein would include AHRQ 
considering strengthening their HSOPS tool by ensuring that its future edition is equally 
supportive of all five HRO constructs. 
Finally, it is recommended that the Joint Commission continues to work on a prescription for the 
hospitals it accredits to transfer to an HRO. The prescription should be followed by safety-
related measures that are included in the accreditation requirements because what gets measured, 
gets managed. The recommended suggestions are useful for hospital safety programs, patient 
safety survey developers, and hospital accrediting bodies- all have patient safety at the core of 
their operations. 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this research was to provide suggestions that can be useful to hospitals, 
accrediting bodies, or patient safety survey developers to improve patient safety outcomes by 
coupling high reliability theory with hospital safety-related measures. The research confirmed 
that though the HSOPS was not developed in support of HRO theory, 78.57% of its questions 
were coded against HRO constructs. Through analysis that was limited to the avoiding 
infections safety measure of the Consumer Reports safety score composite, this research proved 
that coupling high reliability theory with the HSOPS can provide predictors for CAUTI 
outcomes in large hospitals. Future research is warranted for either or all of the remaining four 
components of the Hospital Safety Score. 
 
Opportunity for Future Research 
The literature review noted a direct relationship between patient safety culture and adverse 
hospital events; indicating that an improved safety culture reduces the number of adverse 
hospital events. “HROs accept cultural, social, organizational, cognitive and technological 
challenges that are likely to hamper system safety and transform them in[to] opportunities for 
safety improvement” (Bagnara, Parlangeli, & Tartaglia, 2010, p. 713). There is an immediate 
opportunity for researchers to partner with health care practitioners to further understand how 
HRO theory can be implemented within health care operations. 
Application of this research was discussed with the safety administrator of a large hospital in 
the East North Central region. The recommendations herein can be developed as a screening 
and diagnostic tool to identify the organizational units or microsystems that operate with HRO 
tendencies. System quality and safety leaders could use this screening information to develop an 
intervention to accelerate HRO development throughout an organization (J. Simmons, personal 
communication, December 9, 2015).  
The analysis of the HSOPS survey coupled with high reliability theory can provide insight into 
the mindful state necessary for the organization to successfully emulate an HRO. Hospital 
administrators will be able to make decisions on the best way to leverage the output from the 
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HSOPS and assess their organization’s mindful capabilities at the same time. The elements of a 
sustainable safety culture must be measured using a survey that results in focused interventions 
based on areas of improvement identified through analysis and evaluations (American College 
of Surgeons, 2014). As a result of these recommendations, hospital administrators can identify 
areas of improvement based on analysis of their HSOPS survey results and develop focused 
interventions that would improve their CAUTI outcome accordingly. 
In future studies, deploying an intervention with relevant criteria to evaluate the patient safety 
measures used by the hospital is ideal. “Research undertaken to understand and improve high-
reliability organizations must involve… various stakeholders to obtain their [many] perspectives 
and to better identify the boundary conditions… under which these systems operate” (Roberts & 
Rousseau, 1989, p. 134). It is suggested that an expert panel consisting, at a minimum, of 
practitioners, hospital administrators, and safety professionals construct an applicable set of 
criteria for the said intervention. 
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Table A.1 Coefficients for Questions Coded to Reluctance to Simplify 
 
X-Axis Y-Axis Coefficient 
  
X-Axis Y-Axis Coefficient 
A4 A12 0.62549 A16 C2 0.459562 
A4 A16 0.421788 A16 C4 0.428192 
A4 C2 0.571315 A16 C6 0.584087 
A4 C4 0.441572    
A4 C6 0.570973 C2 C4 0.742193 
   C2 C6 0.77656 
A12 A16 0.753864    
A12 C2 0.672066 C4 C6 0.703995 
A12 C4 0.628572    
A12 C6 0.731402    
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Table A.2 Coefficients for Questions Coded to Preoccupation with Failure 
 
X-Axis Y-Axis Coefficient 
  
X-Axis Y-Axis Coefficient 
A8 A9 0.6041125 B4 C3 0.4115735 
A8 A16 0.4580463 B4 C5 0.5695356 
A8 B4 0.6034181 B4 D1 0.3363502 
A8 C3 0.5300965 B4 D2 0.4204205 
A8 C5 0.6587573 B4 D3 0.4925162 
A8 D1 0.3991658 B4 F9 0.6803925 
A8 D2 0.4460813    
A8 D3 0.5896806 C3 C5 0.7985111 
A8 F9 0.6475353 C3 D1 0.7099581 
   C3 D2 0.6923399 
A9 A16 0.4580463 C3 D3 0.6733731 
A9 B4 0.5818209 C3 F9 0.5475101 
A9 C3 0.5006080    
A9 C5 0.6245891 C5 D1 0.6688573 
A9 D1 0.4319155 C5 D2 0.6778338 
A9 D2 0.4556826 C5 D3 0.7317541 
A9 D3 0.4603364 C5 F9 0.6530289 
A9 F9 0.6770250    
   D1 D2 0.87450189 
A16 B4 0.4842124 D1 D3 0.71224343 
A16 C3 0.3523088 D1 F9 0.54077941 
A16 C5 0.4314146    
A16 D1 0.2484403 D2 D3 0.83932775 
A16 D2 0.2994367 D2 F9 0.55449554 
A16 D3 0.3605529 
   A16 F9 0.5180008 D3 F9 0.56192076 
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Appendix 1: Assessing an Organization’s Capabilities for Assured 
Performance  
 
The following reference is found in the second edition of Managing the Unexpected (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007, pp. 102-110). 
 
Assessing your Firm's Preoccupation with Failure. 
 
Page 
102 
         How well do each of the following statements describe your work unit, department, or 
organization? Enter next to each item below the number that corresponds with your 
conclusion: 
         
1 = not at all, 2 = to some extent, 3 = a great deal     
         1 We focus more on our failures than our successes. 
 
  
2 We regard close calls and near misses as a kind of failure 
that reveals potential danger rather than as evidence of 
our success and ability to avoid disaster. 
 
  
3 We treat near misses and errors as information about the 
health of our system and try to learn from them. 
 
  
4 We often update our procedures after experiencing a 
close call or near miss to incorporate our new experience 
and enrich understanding. 
 
  
5 We make it hard for people to hide mistakes of any kind. 
 
  
6 People are inclined to report mistakes that have 
significant consequences even if nobody notices. 
 
  
7 Managers seek out and encourage bad news. 
 
  
8 People feel free to talk to superiors about problems. 
 
  
9 People are reward if they spot problems, mistakes, errors, 
or failures. 
 
  
  
  
         Scoring: Add the numbers. If you score lower than eleven, you are preoccupied with 
success and should be actively considering how you can immediately improve your 
focus on failure. If you score between eleven and eighteen, you have a moderate 
preoccupation with success rather than a fully mindful preoccupation with failure. 
Scores higher than eighteen suggest a healthy preoccupation with failure and a strong 
capacity for mindfulness. 
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Assessing Your Firm's Reluctance to Simplify. 
 
Page 
104 
         How well do each of the following statements describe your work unit, department, or 
organization? Enter next to each item below the number that corresponds with your 
conclusion: 
         
1 = not at all, 2 = to some extent, 3 = a great deal    
         1 People around here take nothing for granted. 
 
  
2 Questioning is encouraged. 
 
  
3 We strive to challenge the status quo. 
 
  
4 People in this organization feel free to bring up problems 
and tough issues. 
 
  
5 People generally prolong their analysis to better grasp the 
nature of the problem that come up. 
 
  
6 People are encouraged to express different views of the 
world. 
 
  
7 People listen carefully; it is rare that anyone's view is 
dismissed. 
 
  
8 People are not shot down for surfacing information that 
could interrupt operations. 
 
  
9 When something unexpected happens, people are more 
concerned with listening and conducting a complete 
analysis of the situation than with advocating for their 
view. 
 
  
10 We appreciate skeptics. 
 
  
11 People demonstrate trust for each other. 
 
  
12 
People show a great deal of mutual respect for each 
other. 
 
  
         
         Scoring: Add the numbers. If you score higher than twenty-four, the potential to avoid 
simplification is strong. If you score between fourteen and twenty-four, the potential to 
avoid simplification is moderate. Scores lower than fourteen suggest that you should be 
actively considering how you can immediately improve your capabilities to prevent 
simplification in order to improve your firm's capacity for mindfulness. 
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Assessing Your Firm's Sensitivity to Operations. 
 
Page 
106 
         Respond agree or disagree with the following statements about your work, unit,
department or organization. 
         
         1 On a day-to-day basis, there is an ongoing presence of 
someone who is paying attention to what is happening and is 
readily available for consultation of something unexpected 
arises. 
 
  
2 Should problems occur, someone with authority to act is 
always accessible and available, especially to people on the 
front lines. 
 
  
3 Supervisors readily pitch in whenever necessary. 
 
  
4 During an average day, people come into enough contact with 
each other to build a clear picture of the current situation. 
 
  
5 People are always looking for feedback about things that aren't 
going right. 
 
  
6 People are familiar with operations beyond one's own job. 
 
  
7 We have access to resources if unexpected surprises crop up. 
 
  
8 Managers constantly monitor workloads and are able to obtain 
additional resources if the workload starts to become 
excessive. 
 
  
Scoring: Count the numbers of agree and disagree responses. The greater the number of 
disagree responses, the less the sensitivity to operations. Use these questions to begin 
thinking of ways to improve your sensitivity to operations and capacity for mindfulness. 
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Assessing Your Firm's Commitment to Resilience 
 
Page 
108 
         How well do each of the following statements describe your work unit, department, or 
organization? Enter next to each item below the number that corresponds with your 
conclusion: 
         
1 = not at all, 2 = to some extent, 3 = a great deal    
         1 Forecasting and predicting the future is not that 
important here. 
 
  
2 Resources are continually devoted to training and 
retraining people on the properties of the technical 
system. 
 
  
3 People have more than enough training and experience 
for the kind of work they have to do. 
 
  
4 This organization is actively concerned with developing 
people's skill and knowledge. 
 
  
5 This organization encourages challenging stretch 
assignments. 
 
  
6 People around here are known for their ability to use 
their knowledge in novel ways. 
 
  
7 There is a concern with building people's competence 
and response repertoires. 
 
  
8 People have a number of informal contacts that they 
sometimes use to solve problems. 
 
  
9 People learn from their mistakes. 
 
  
10 People are able to rely on others. 
 
  
         
         Scoring: Add the numbers. If you score higher than twenty, the commitment to 
resilience is strong. If you score between twelve and twenty, the commitment to 
resilience is moderate. Scores lower than twelve suggest that you should be actively 
considering how you can immediately begin building resilience and the capacity for 
mindfulness. 
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Assessing the Dereference to Expertise in Your Firm. 
Page 
110 
         How well do each of the following statements describe your work unit, department, or 
organization? Enter next to each item below the number that corresponds with your 
conclusion: 
         
1 = not at all, 2 = to some extent, 3 = a great deal    
         1 People are committed to doing their job well. 
 
  
2 People respect the nature of one another's job activities. 
 
  
3 If something out of the ordinary happens, people know 
who has the expertise to respond. 
 
  
4 People in this organization value expertise and 
experience over hierarchical rank. 
 
  
5 In this organization, the people most qualified to make 
decisions make them. 
 
  
6 If something unexpected occurs, the most highly 
qualified people, regardless of rank, make the decisions. 
 
  
7 People typically "own" a problem until it is resolved. 
 
  
8 It is generally easy for us to obtain expert assistance 
when something comes up that we don't know how to 
handle. 
 
  
         
         
Scoring: Add the numbers. If you score higher than sixteen, the deference to expertise 
is strong. If you score between ten and sixteen, the deference to expertise is moderate. 
Scores lower than ten suggest that you should actively think of ways to improve the 
deference to expertise and the capacity for mindfulness. 
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Appendix 2: Hospital Survey on Patient Safety 
 
Instructions  
This survey asks for your opinions about patient safety issues, medical error, and event 
reporting in your hospital and will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete.   
If you do not wish to answer a question, or if a question does not apply to you, you may 
leave your answer blank.  
 
• An “event” is defined as any type of error, mistake, 
incident, accident, or deviation, regardless of whether or 
not it results in patient harm.  
• “Patient safety” is defined as the avoidance and 
prevention of patient injuries or adverse events resulting 
from the processes of health care delivery.  
 
 
SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit 
 
In this survey, think of your “unit” as the work area, department, or clinical area of the 
hospital where you spend most of your work time or provide most of your clinical services. 
 
 
What is your primary work area or unit in this hospital? Select ONE answer.  
 a. Many different hospital units/No specific unit 
 b. Medicine (non-surgical)  h. Psychiatry/mental health 
 c. Surgery  i. Rehabilitation 
 d. Obstetrics   j. Pharmacy     
 e. Pediatrics   k. Laboratory    
 f. Emergency department   l. Radiology      
 g. Intensive care unit (any type)   m. Anesthesiology      
  n. Other, please specify: 
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Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your 
work area/unit.   
 Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Think about your hospital work area/unit…       
1. People support one another in this unit  1 2 3 4 5 
2. We have enough staff to handle the workload  1 2 3 4 5 
3. When a lot of work needs to be done 
quickly, we work together as a team to get 
the work done  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. In this unit, people treat each other with 
respect  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Staff in this unit work longer hours than is 
best for patient care  1 2 3 4 5 
6. We are actively doing things to improve 
patient safety  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. We use more agency/temporary staff than is 
best for patient care  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Staff feel like their mistakes are held against 
them 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here 1 2 3 4 5 
10. It is just by chance that more serious 
mistakes don’t happen around here  
     
11. When one area in this unit gets really 
busy, others help out 
     
12. When an event is reported, it feels like 
the person is being written up, not the 
problem 
     
13. After we make changes to improve 
patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness 
     
14. We work in "crisis mode" trying to do 
too much, too quickly 
     
15. Patient safety is never sacrificed to get 
more work done 
     
16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are 
kept in their personnel file 
     
17. We have patient safety problems in this 
unit 
     
18. Our procedures and systems are good at 
preventing errors from happening 
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SECTION B: Your Supervisor/ Manager 
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your 
immediate supervisor/manager or person to whom you directly report.   
 
 Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Think about your hospital work area/unit…       
1. My supervisor/manager says a good word 
when he/she sees a job done according to 
established patient safety procedures 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. My supervisor/manager seriously considers 
staff suggestions for improving patient safety 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. My supervisor/manager overlooks patient 
safety problems that happen over and over 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
SECTION C: Communications 
 
How often do the following things happen in your work area/unit? 
 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Most of 
the time 
Always 
Think about your hospital work area/unit…       
1. We are given feedback about changes put into 
place based on event reports 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Staff will freely speak up if they see some-
thing that may negatively affect patient care 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. We are informed about errors that happen in 
this unit  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Staff feel free to question the decisions or 
actions of those with more authority 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors 
from happening again 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Staff are afraid to ask questions when 
something does not seem right 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION D: Frequency of Events Reported 
 
In your hospital work area/unit, when the following mistakes happen, how often are they 
reported? 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Most of 
the time 
Always 
1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and 
corrected before affecting the patient, how 
often is this reported? 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. When a mistake is made, but has no 
potential to harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. When a mistake is made that could harm 
the patient, but does not, how often is this 
reported? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
SECTION E: Patient Safety Grade  
 
Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety.    
         
A  B  C  D  E 
Excellent     Very Good     Acceptable       Poor  Failing 
 
SECTION F: Your Hospital  
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your 
hospital. 
 Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Think about your hospital…       
1. Hospital management provides a work climate 
that promotes patient safety 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Hospital units do not coordinate well with 
each other 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Things “fall between the cracks” when 
transferring patients from one unit to another 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. There is good cooperation among hospital 
units that need to work together 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION F: Your Hospital (continued) 
 
 Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Think about your hospital…       
5. Important patient care information is often 
lost during shift changes  
1 2 3  4 5 
6. It is often unpleasant to work with staff from 
other hospital units 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Problems often occur in the exchange of 
information across hospital units 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. The actions of hospital management show 
that patient safety is a top priority  
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Hospital management seems interested in 
patient safety only after an adverse event 
happens 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Hospital units work well together to 
provide the best care for patients 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Shift changes are problematic for patients 
in this hospital 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
SECTION G: Number of Events Reported 
 
In the past 12 months, how many event reports have you filled out and submitted?   
 a. No event reports   d. 6 to 10 event reports  
 b. 1 to 2 event reports   e. 11 to 20 event reports  
 c. 3 to 5 event reports   f. 21 event reports or more  
 
 
SECTION H: Background Information  
 
This information will help in the analysis of the survey results.  
1. How long have you worked in this hospital?  
 a. Less than 1 year   d. 11 to 15 years  
 b. 1 to 5 years    e. 16 to 20 years  
 c. 6 to 10 years   f. 21 years or more  
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SECTION H: Background Information (continued)  
 
2. How long have you worked in your current hospital work area/unit?  
 a. Less than 1 year    d. 11 to 15 years  
 b. 1 to 5 years    e. 16 to 20 years  
 c. 6 to 10 years    f. 21 years or more  
 
3. Typically, how many hours per week do you work in this hospital?  
a. Less than 20 hours per week  d. 60 to 79 hours per week  
 b. 20 to 39 hours per week    e. 80 to 99 hours per week  
c. 40 to 59 hours per week    f. 100 hours per week or more   
 
4. What is your staff position in this hospital?  Select ONE answer that best describes your 
staff position.  
 a. Physician Assistant/ Nurse Practitioner 
 b. Registered Nurse  h. Dietician 
 c. LVN/ LPN  i. Unit Assistant/Clerk/Secretary 
 d. Patient Care Asst/ Hospital 
Aide/Care Partner 
 j. Respiratory Therapist 
 e. Attending/Staff Physician 
 k. Physical, Occupational, or Speech 
Therapist  
 f. Resident Physician/Physician in 
Training 
 l. Technician (e.g., EKG, Lab, 
Radiology)   
 g. Pharmacist   m. Administration/Management  
  n. Other, please specify: 
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5. In your staff position, do you typically have direct interaction or contact with patients? 
 a. YES, I typically have direct interaction or contact with patients.  
 b. NO, I typically do NOT have direct interaction or contact with patients. 
 
6. How long have you worked in your current specialty or profession?  
 
a. Less than 1 year   d. 11 to 15 years  
 b. 1 to 5 years   e. 16 to 20 years  
 c. 6 to 10 years   f. 21 years or more  
 
 
SECTION I: Your Comments  
 
Please feel free to write any comments about patient safety, error, or event reporting in 
your hospital.  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY. 
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Appendix 3: HRO Scoring System Results 
 
PUBLIC ID 
HRO 
S2O 
Score 
HRO 
R2S 
Score 
HRO 
PwF 
Score 
HRO 
D2E 
Score 
HRO 
C2R 
Score 
HRO 
Score Region BSC Gov Teach 
8 7 5 8 4 3 27 9 3 0 0 
12 5 3 4 3 3 18 6 8 0 1 
17 7 4 7 3 3 24 1 6 0 1 
19 7 5 9 3 3 27 4 3 0 0 
47 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 6 0 0 
49 4 4 8 3 2 21 1 6 1 1 
70 5 4 6 3 3 21 4 8 0 1 
71 5 4 7 2 3 21 4 5 0 0 
81 8 5 9 4 3 29 9 5 0 0 
85 9 5 9 4 3 30 4 4 0 0 
97 8 4 9 4 3 28 4 2 0 0 
99 8 6 10 4 3 31 9 6 0 1 
109 8 6 9 4 3 30 3 8 0 1 
112 4 5 7 3 3 22 3 2 0 0 
123 9 6 9 4 3 31 4 2 1 0 
142 6 6 9 4 3 28 3 6 0 0 
146 9 6 10 4 3 32 3 2 1 0 
169 8 5 9 4 3 29 7 7 0 0 
174 9 4 8 4 3 28 7 4 0 0 
176 5 5 8 3 3 24 4 5 0 1 
180 7 4 9 3 3 26 6 2 0 0 
190 9 4 9 4 3 29 3 4 1 0 
205 7 4 9 2 3 25 1 6 0 0 
206 7 4 8 3 3 25 3 5 0 1 
215 8 6 9 3 3 29 9 6 0 1 
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PUBLIC ID 
HRO 
S2O 
Score 
HRO 
R2S 
Score 
HRO 
PwF 
Score 
HRO 
D2E 
Score 
HRO 
C2R 
Score 
HRO 
Score Region BSC Gov Teach 
220 7 5 8 4 3 27 3 2 0 0 
243 5 4 8 3 3 23 7 7 1 1 
253 8 6 9 4 3 30 4 4 0 0 
291 5 6 9 3 3 26 3 3 0 0 
293 8 6 9 3 3 29 3 3 0 0 
302 7 6 9 3 3 28 4 3 0 0 
319 8 6 9 4 3 30 9 7 0 0 
321 8 4 8 4 3 27 6 4 0 0 
323 4 4 6 2 3 19 1 4 0 0 
339 8 5 9 3 3 28 4 4 0 0 
356 7 4 9 3 3 26 7 8 0 1 
372 8 4 8 3 3 26 5 5 0 1 
374 6 4 8 3 3 24 5 5 0 0 
377 5 3 6 3 3 20 9 5 0 1 
378 7 5 9 3 3 27 3 2 0 0 
395 9 5 9 4 3 30 6 7 0 1 
400 5 4 8 3 3 23 7 8 0 1 
404 9 6 9 4 3 31 9 2 0 0 
416 9 5 9 4 3 30 7 2 0 0 
458 9 6 9 4 3 31 7 4 0 0 
473 5 4 8 3 3 23 1 5 0 0 
490 5 4 7 3 2 21 4 7 0 1 
504 6 4 8 3 3 24 9 7 0 1 
523 9 5 9 4 3 30 7 2 0 0 
543 8 4 9 3 3 27 7 4 0 0 
578 5 4 7 2 3 21 1 4 0 1 
591 5 4 7 2 2 20 4 7 0 1 
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PUBLIC ID 
HRO 
S2O 
Score 
HRO 
R2S 
Score 
HRO 
PwF 
Score 
HRO 
D2E 
Score 
HRO 
C2R 
Score 
HRO 
Score Region BSC Gov Teach 
602 6 5 8 3 3 25 9 3 0 0 
609 5 4 8 2 3 22 1 4 0 1 
624 9 6 10 4 3 32 3 4 0 0 
634 7 4 9 3 3 26 4 8 0 1 
642 3 3 6 3 2 17 3 4 0 0 
661 6 4 8 3 3 24 1 6 0 1 
668 9 5 9 4 3 30 5 3 0 0 
675 4 4 6 2 3 19 4 4 0 0 
689 9 5 9 3 3 29 4 6 0 0 
692 6 5 9 3 3 26 3 3 0 0 
693 7 5 8 3 3 26 3 8 1 0 
728 6 4 7 3 3 23 4 5 0 0 
739 6 5 8 3 3 25 9 4 0 0 
751 6 4 7 3 2 22 4 7 0 0 
760 6 4 7 3 3 23 4 4 0 1 
766 9 5 8 4 3 29 6 3 0 0 
772 4 4 5 3 3 19 4 4 0 0 
776 7 4 8 3 3 25 3 6 1 0 
794 6 4 6 3 3 22 4 5 0 1 
796 9 6 9 4 3 31 1 2 0 0 
809 9 4 8 3 3 27 3 2 0 0 
810 5 4 9 3 3 24 4 4 0 0 
813 9 5 9 4 3 30 6 2 0 0 
828 6 6 9 4 3 28 5 3 0 0 
837 5 4 8 2 2 21 1 6 0 1 
848 7 6 9 4 3 29 1 5 0 1 
853 9 6 10 4 3 32 6 2 0 0 
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PUBLIC ID 
HRO 
S2O 
Score 
HRO 
R2S 
Score 
HRO 
PwF 
Score 
HRO 
D2E 
Score 
HRO 
C2R 
Score 
HRO 
Score Region BSC Gov Teach 
866 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 5 1 0 
881 8 4 9 3 3 27 3 4 0 0 
896 6 5 8 3 3 25 3 6 0 0 
915 8 5 8 4 3 28 3 3 0 0 
919 6 4 9 4 3 26 4 4 0 0 
933 5 4 8 3 3 23 3 8 0 0 
957 5 3 7 2 2 19 4 7 0 1 
970 5 4 8 3 3 23 4 5 0 1 
1019 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 2 0 0 
1053 9 6 9 4 3 31 7 3 0 0 
1057 8 5 9 4 3 29 1 3 0 1 
1060 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 4 0 0 
1074 5 4 7 3 3 22 4 4 0 0 
1080 5 4 9 3 3 24 1 4 0 1 
1101 6 5 9 4 3 27 3 2 0 0 
1119 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 5 0 0 
1132 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 7 0 0 
1133 5 4 6 2 3 20 3 4 0 1 
1150 7 6 8 4 3 28 7 2 1 0 
1164 7 5 8 4 3 27 3 6 0 1 
1221 6 5 8 4 3 26 3 5 0 1 
1230 9 4 5 3 3 24 3 8 0 1 
1234 5 4 8 3 3 23 3 8 0 0 
1239 7 6 8 3 3 27 1 6 0 1 
1258 5 4 7 3 3 22 1 4 0 0 
1264 7 5 9 3 3 27 4 7 0 1 
1267 6 4 8 3 3 24 1 8 0 1 
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PUBLIC ID 
HRO 
S2O 
Score 
HRO 
R2S 
Score 
HRO 
PwF 
Score 
HRO 
D2E 
Score 
HRO 
C2R 
Score 
HRO 
Score Region BSC Gov Teach 
1280 7 5 8 4 3 27 9 5 0 1 
1283 8 6 8 3 3 28 9 5 0 1 
1284 4 4 7 3 2 20 3 8 0 1 
1289 9 5 9 4 3 30 4 3 1 1 
1303 8 5 8 4 3 28 4 4 0 1 
1306 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 4 0 0 
1312 5 4 8 4 3 24 7 1 0 0 
1318 9 6 9 4 3 31 4 2 0 0 
1329 9 6 9 4 3 31 9 2 0 1 
1347 9 4 7 4 3 27 3 4 0 1 
1349 8 3 8 3 3 25 9 1 0 1 
1354 5 4 8 4 3 24 7 4 0 0 
1412 6 5 8 4 3 26 9 1 0 0 
1424 6 4 7 3 3 23 5 4 0 1 
1449 6 4 7 3 3 23 1 5 0 1 
1475 8 6 10 4 3 31 4 1 0 0 
1477 8 6 9 4 3 30 3 6 0 0 
1490 9 5 7 4 3 28 5 3 0 1 
1553 5 5 7 4 3 24 1 3 0 0 
1566 7 4 8 3 3 25 1 5 0 0 
1570 9 6 9 4 3 31 5 3 0 0 
1572 5 4 8 3 3 23 1 8 0 1 
1582 5 4 8 3 3 23 3 5 0 1 
1588 8 4 9 3 3 27 4 2 0 0 
1601 5 4 8 3 3 23 3 4 0 0 
1619 9 6 10 4 3 32 3 3 0 0 
1627 6 4 9 4 3 26 5 8 0 1 
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PUBLIC ID 
HRO 
S2O 
Score 
HRO 
R2S 
Score 
HRO 
PwF 
Score 
HRO 
D2E 
Score 
HRO 
C2R 
Score 
HRO 
Score Region BSC Gov Teach 
1637 6 5 8 3 3 25 4 3 0 0 
1644 8 6 9 4 3 30 1 4 0 1 
1655 5 4 6 3 3 21 4 7 0 1 
1666 4 4 8 3 3 22 1 7 1 1 
1670 9 6 10 4 3 32 4 2 0 0 
1705 9 4 9 3 3 28 9 2 0 0 
1809 9 5 7 4 3 28 4 3 0 0 
1810 5 4 6 2 3 20 4 5 0 0 
1818 8 5 8 4 3 28 7 4 0 0 
1820 9 5 9 4 3 30 3 8 0 0 
1821 5 4 7 3 3 22 9 7 0 0 
1836 9 5 9 4 3 30 7 2 0 0 
1840 7 5 9 4 3 28 4 5 0 1 
1841 8 4 8 3 3 26 4 2 0 0 
1867 6 4 8 3 3 24 5 6 1 0 
1871 7 4 7 3 3 24 9 6 0 0 
1890 4 4 7 3 3 21 6 2 0 0 
1891 9 6 9 4 3 31 4 5 0 0 
1901 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 2 0 0 
1904 9 6 9 4 3 31 7 1 1 0 
1909 6 5 6 3 3 23 3 6 0 1 
1935 6 4 7 2 3 22 4 5 0 1 
1957 5 4 8 3 3 23 1 5 1 1 
1972 7 5 9 3 3 27 5 8 1 1 
1986 5 4 8 3 3 23 4 7 0 0 
1996 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 2 0 0 
1997 5 4 8 2 3 22 5 5 0 0 
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PUBLIC ID 
HRO 
S2O 
Score 
HRO 
R2S 
Score 
HRO 
PwF 
Score 
HRO 
D2E 
Score 
HRO 
C2R 
Score 
HRO 
Score Region BSC Gov Teach 
2002 5 5 8 3 3 24 9 6 0 0 
2008 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 6 1 0 
2016 9 4 8 4 3 28 7 6 0 1 
2058 7 4 7 3 3 24 3 2 0 1 
2059 9 4 9 3 3 28 6 1 1 0 
2062 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 1 0 0 
2076 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 5 0 0 
2089 5 6 8 3 3 25 1 4 0 1 
2101 6 4 7 3 3 23 4 3 0 0 
2131 7 5 8 4 3 27 6 3 1 1 
2158 7 5 9 3 3 27 4 4 0 0 
2161 6 4 7 3 3 23 3 6 0 0 
2183 4 4 8 3 3 22 4 5 0 0 
2187 7 4 8 3 3 25 3 5 0 0 
2196 7 6 10 4 3 30 9 2 0 0 
2232 7 6 10 3 3 29 4 2 0 0 
2249 6 5 9 3 3 26 1 6 0 1 
2257 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 4 0 1 
2283 8 5 9 3 3 28 9 2 1 0 
2287 8 5 9 4 3 29 4 5 0 1 
2298 8 6 9 3 3 29 1 4 0 0 
2309 3 4 3 3 2 15 3 4 0 0 
2319 9 5 8 3 3 28 7 4 0 1 
2326 6 5 8 4 3 26 4 2 0 0 
2333 7 4 8 4 3 26 3 5 0 1 
2340 7 5 8 3 3 26 7 5 0 1 
2346 7 4 8 3 3 25 4 8 0 1 
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2356 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 4 0 0 
2361 7 4 7 4 3 25 9 1 1 0 
2365 8 5 8 4 3 28 5 2 1 0 
2367 5 3 7 3 3 21 9 7 0 0 
2377 7 4 7 3 3 24 9 2 1 0 
2381 8 5 8 3 3 27 3 4 0 0 
2385 8 5 8 4 2 27 7 1 0 0 
2392 4 4 6 3 3 20 4 5 0 0 
2405 8 5 9 3 3 28 6 5 0 1 
2406 5 5 8 3 3 24 4 6 0 1 
2407 6 3 8 3 3 23 6 3 0 0 
2411 7 4 8 3 3 25 4 5 0 1 
2454 8 5 9 4 3 29 3 4 0 1 
2471 6 6 7 4 3 26 4 3 0 0 
2480 4 1 6 1 2 14 3 2 0 0 
2504 5 4 8 3 3 23 9 5 1 1 
2525 7 5 8 4 3 27 4 4 0 0 
2540 6 5 8 3 3 25 3 8 1 1 
2548 5 4 8 3 3 23 3 8 0 0 
2552 7 4 8 3 3 25 4 8 0 1 
2556 5 4 8 3 3 23 1 5 0 1 
2585 9 6 9 4 3 31 9 2 0 1 
2595 6 5 8 3 3 25 3 4 0 1 
2614 7 4 7 3 3 24 1 3 0 0 
2621 9 5 9 4 3 30 7 4 0 0 
2633 8 4 8 3 3 26 4 4 0 0 
2662 9 5 9 4 3 30 5 5 0 0 
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2666 6 4 8 3 3 24 1 5 0 0 
2673 8 5 9 4 3 29 9 8 0 0 
2679 7 4 9 2 3 25 3 3 0 0 
2682 8 4 9 4 3 28 4 2 0 0 
2702 9 5 9 4 3 30 4 2 0 1 
2710 9 5 9 4 3 30 7 4 0 0 
2737 9 6 9 4 3 31 4 2 0 0 
2738 6 4 8 3 3 24 9 8 0 1 
2773 6 5 9 4 3 27 9 4 0 1 
2774 9 6 9 4 3 31 5 3 0 0 
2776 6 4 8 3 3 24 9 4 0 0 
2784 6 4 8 3 3 24 3 4 0 0 
2795 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 2 0 0 
2801 8 4 8 3 3 26 4 4 0 0 
2811 5 4 8 3 3 23 1 8 0 1 
2813 7 5 9 4 3 28 4 2 0 0 
2821 7 4 6 3 3 23 4 5 0 1 
2829 4 4 6 3 3 20 1 7 0 0 
2836 6 4 5 3 3 21 1 4 0 1 
2842 7 3 8 3 3 24 7 6 1 0 
2854 6 5 9 4 3 27 7 7 0 1 
2856 6 5 9 4 3 27 4 5 0 0 
2857 1 2 3 3 2 11 1 6 0 1 
2866 7 3 6 2 3 21 6 2 0 0 
2869 7 3 9 4 3 26 7 6 0 1 
2873 5 5 8 3 3 24 3 8 0 1 
2874 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 3 0 0 
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2875 6 4 8 2 3 23 4 3 0 0 
2893 4 4 6 2 2 18 1 8 0 0 
2910 6 5 9 4 3 27 3 4 0 0 
2918 5 4 8 3 3 23 1 6 0 0 
2930 6 4 8 3 3 24 7 4 0 0 
2937 4 4 8 2 2 20 9 8 1 1 
2949 4 4 6 3 3 20 5 4 0 1 
2962 6 3 8 3 3 23 9 4 1 0 
2979 9 5 8 4 3 29 7 8 0 1 
2990 5 3 7 3 2 20 7 4 0 0 
2997 9 6 10 4 3 32 4 3 1 0 
3011 9 4 9 3 3 28 4 3 0 0 
3080 7 6 9 4 3 29 9 3 0 0 
3094 9 5 9 3 3 29 6 1 0 0 
3115 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 3 0 0 
3131 8 6 10 4 3 31 6 2 1 0 
3134 6 5 8 3 3 25 7 4 0 1 
3142 5 3 7 3 3 21 5 2 0 0 
3144 8 6 9 3 3 29 3 8 1 1 
3174 6 4 8 4 3 25 1 6 1 1 
3178 6 3 8 3 3 23 7 5 1 0 
3179 8 5 9 3 3 28 1 3 0 0 
3193 7 5 8 3 3 26 3 5 1 0 
3200 9 6 9 4 3 31 5 2 1 0 
3231 5 4 8 3 3 23 5 8 0 1 
3232 4 4 8 3 2 21 1 8 1 1 
3240 8 4 9 3 3 27 7 4 0 1 
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3262 5 4 7 3 3 22 1 8 0 1 
3275 9 6 10 4 3 32 1 3 0 0 
3293 9 5 8 4 3 29 3 8 1 0 
3297 5 5 8 3 3 24 4 4 0 1 
3306 5 4 8 3 3 23 3 4 0 0 
3316 8 6 9 4 3 30 3 4 0 0 
3364 6 4 9 3 3 25 4 5 0 1 
3383 6 4 8 3 3 24 5 5 0 0 
3393 9 6 10 4 3 32 4 2 0 0 
3417 9 6 10 4 3 32 3 1 0 0 
3450 3 4 4 3 2 16 7 3 0 0 
3455 7 6 9 3 3 28 3 4 0 1 
3468 7 6 10 4 3 30 4 5 0 0 
3474 7 5 9 4 3 28 6 2 0 1 
3476 9 6 10 3 3 31 1 4 0 1 
3482 4 3 8 3 2 20 1 5 1 1 
3490 7 4 7 3 3 24 3 3 0 1 
3502 6 5 7 3 3 24 3 7 0 1 
3514 7 4 8 3 3 25 4 2 1 0 
3528 5 3 7 3 2 20 9 4 0 0 
3529 8 6 9 3 3 29 9 3 0 0 
3564 7 6 9 3 3 28 7 4 1 1 
3568 7 4 8 3 3 25 1 4 0 0 
3589 9 5 9 4 3 30 5 5 1 0 
3593 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 3 0 0 
3613 4 2 6 2 3 17 4 5 0 0 
3620 3 4 7 2 2 18 9 7 1 1 
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3634 8 6 9 4 3 30 9 4 0 0 
3637 5 4 6 2 2 19 1 4 0 0 
3657 5 4 8 2 3 22 4 4 0 1 
3660 6 4 8 3 2 23 1 6 1 1 
3672 7 4 8 3 3 25 3 6 0 0 
3683 8 5 9 3 3 28 4 6 0 1 
3695 9 6 9 4 3 31 5 5 0 0 
3703 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 4 0 0 
3710 6 4 8 3 3 24 1 7 0 1 
3717 9 4 8 4 3 28 6 4 0 0 
3726 9 5 9 4 3 30 7 3 1 0 
3756 5 4 8 2 3 22 1 8 0 1 
3757 9 4 9 3 3 28 4 4 0 0 
3762 7 5 9 3 3 27 5 4 0 0 
3798 6 3 7 2 2 20 4 5 0 0 
3799 6 4 9 3 3 25 4 6 0 1 
3807 9 5 9 3 3 29 5 3 0 0 
3821 5 5 9 3 3 25 3 4 0 0 
3832 6 4 9 3 3 25 4 4 0 0 
3850 9 6 10 4 3 32 4 3 0 0 
3854 5 4 8 4 3 24 7 6 0 1 
3876 8 4 9 4 3 28 9 2 0 0 
3892 5 4 8 3 3 23 5 3 1 0 
3901 7 6 9 4 3 29 3 3 0 0 
3909 7 5 8 3 3 26 3 6 1 0 
3930 7 4 8 3 3 25 5 8 0 1 
3931 8 4 8 3 3 26 1 5 0 0 
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3937 4 4 4 3 3 18 9 6 0 1 
3950 8 4 8 3 3 26 7 6 0 1 
3963 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 1 0 0 
3965 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 5 0 0 
3972 6 5 8 3 3 25 4 5 0 0 
3973 5 6 9 3 3 26 4 5 0 0 
3986 9 5 9 4 3 30 6 2 1 0 
3997 8 4 9 3 3 27 4 2 0 0 
4005 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 7 0 0 
4010 8 6 9 3 3 29 1 3 0 1 
4017 7 3 8 4 3 25 7 2 0 0 
4018 5 4 9 2 3 23 7 4 1 0 
4028 9 6 10 4 3 32 4 4 0 1 
4062 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 1 1 0 
4074 7 5 8 3 3 26 3 8 1 0 
4113 7 5 9 4 3 28 3 5 0 1 
4124 6 5 8 4 3 26 5 2 0 0 
4126 6 4 9 3 3 25 4 3 0 0 
4132 9 6 10 4 3 32 6 3 0 1 
4137 8 4 9 3 3 27 1 4 0 0 
4153 4 2 7 3 2 18 7 3 0 0 
4157 4 4 8 3 2 21 5 3 0 0 
4215 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 7 0 0 
4229 8 5 10 4 3 30 6 2 1 0 
4232 5 3 4 2 2 16 6 2 1 1 
4240 8 4 9 3 3 27 5 4 0 0 
4261 9 6 10 4 3 32 6 2 0 0 
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4270 5 4 8 4 2 23 7 4 1 0 
4283 6 4 8 3 3 24 1 6 0 0 
4291 8 4 8 4 3 27 9 6 0 1 
4303 8 5 9 4 3 29 5 4 1 0 
4312 8 6 10 4 3 31 6 3 1 0 
4348 7 5 9 4 3 28 6 4 0 0 
4373 4 4 9 3 3 23 1 2 0 0 
4395 6 4 7 3 3 23 9 2 0 0 
4408 8 6 9 4 3 30 6 5 0 1 
4443 9 6 9 4 3 31 4 3 0 0 
4452 6 5 8 4 3 26 1 3 0 0 
4462 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 4 0 0 
4471 6 5 8 3 3 25 4 5 0 1 
4481 8 5 9 3 3 28 4 5 0 0 
4492 8 5 8 4 3 28 7 2 0 0 
4512 8 6 9 4 3 30 9 4 0 1 
4526 9 6 10 4 3 32 3 1 0 0 
4582 8 4 8 3 3 26 3 3 0 0 
4598 7 5 8 4 3 27 3 8 1 0 
4607 5 5 8 2 3 23 4 4 0 0 
4639 8 5 9 3 3 28 1 3 0 0 
4666 4 4 7 3 2 20 9 8 1 1 
4671 5 4 7 3 3 22 1 7 0 1 
4678 3 3 6 3 2 17 9 4 0 0 
4698 5 4 8 3 3 23 4 5 0 1 
4716 6 4 8 3 3 24 9 2 0 0 
4718 8 4 8 3 3 26 4 5 0 0 
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4734 3 4 8 3 2 20 1 6 1 1 
4749 9 5 9 4 3 30 7 3 1 0 
4764 4 4 5 3 3 19 6 8 1 1 
4768 7 5 8 3 3 26 4 4 0 0 
4820 7 4 8 3 3 25 9 5 1 1 
4850 5 5 9 3 3 25 6 5 0 1 
4853 4 4 7 3 3 21 1 3 0 1 
4861 6 5 8 3 3 25 4 4 0 0 
4877 9 6 9 4 3 31 6 1 1 0 
4920 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 6 0 0 
4925 8 4 8 4 3 27 4 4 1 0 
4936 6 4 8 3 3 24 3 5 0 0 
4937 5 3 7 3 2 20 4 8 0 1 
4944 9 6 10 4 3 32 3 2 1 0 
4949 8 4 9 4 3 28 1 5 0 0 
4967 9 6 10 4 3 32 9 2 0 0 
4969 5 5 6 2 3 21 6 3 0 0 
5007 8 6 9 4 3 30 3 4 1 0 
5019 8 5 8 4 3 28 1 4 0 0 
5020 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 5 0 0 
5043 4 4 8 3 3 22 6 1 1 0 
5045 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 3 0 0 
5052 4 3 5 2 3 17 4 7 0 1 
5084 7 6 8 4 3 28 4 2 0 0 
5091 4 4 7 3 3 21 1 6 0 1 
5103 6 4 9 3 3 25 6 5 0 1 
5183 3 3 8 3 3 20 1 8 1 1 
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5188 8 6 8 4 3 29 7 5 0 0 
5222 8 6 9 4 3 30 4 8 0 1 
5230 9 6 10 4 3 32 9 2 0 0 
5239 5 4 5 3 3 20 4 3 0 0 
5260 9 6 9 4 3 31 7 2 0 0 
5265 7 3 5 4 3 22 3 4 1 0 
5273 4 4 8 3 3 22 4 6 0 1 
5279 5 4 8 3 2 22 1 5 0 1 
5281 5 4 8 3 3 23 4 4 0 1 
5289 9 6 9 4 3 31 9 2 0 0 
5311 5 4 8 3 3 23 3 7 0 0 
5318 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 4 1 0 
5344 6 4 6 3 3 22 1 8 0 1 
5349 9 4 9 4 3 29 6 3 1 0 
5357 4 4 7 3 3 21 1 6 0 1 
5363 8 5 9 3 3 28 4 8 0 1 
5377 7 4 8 4 2 25 4 4 0 0 
5396 8 4 8 4 3 27 4 1 0 0 
5403 7 4 7 3 3 24 6 7 0 0 
5405 7 4 8 4 3 26 7 3 0 0 
5409 8 5 7 3 3 26 4 3 0 0 
5415 7 4 8 4 3 26 7 2 0 0 
5422 8 5 9 3 3 28 4 1 0 0 
5423 9 6 9 4 3 31 7 2 0 0 
5425 7 5 9 4 3 28 6 5 0 0 
5438 7 4 8 4 3 26 9 4 1 0 
5439 9 6 10 4 3 32 4 3 0 0 
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5476 5 4 8 3 2 22 4 2 0 0 
5514 5 4 8 4 2 23 6 3 1 0 
5523 8 6 9 4 3 30 4 3 0 0 
5527 8 5 8 3 3 27 1 2 0 0 
5547 6 4 7 4 3 24 4 2 0 0 
5558 7 5 8 4 3 27 5 2 0 0 
5575 5 4 8 3 3 23 7 8 0 1 
5576 7 5 9 4 3 28 3 1 0 1 
5604 5 4 7 3 3 22 4 4 0 0 
5607 9 4 9 4 3 29 4 1 0 0 
5613 8 6 9 4 3 30 9 3 0 1 
5623 7 5 9 4 3 28 4 1 0 0 
5643 8 6 9 4 3 30 9 4 0 0 
5649 6 5 9 3 3 26 4 5 0 1 
5660 7 4 9 3 3 26 6 6 0 0 
5688 7 4 9 3 3 26 9 6 0 1 
5709 6 4 8 3 3 24 9 3 0 0 
5763 9 6 10 4 3 32 3 3 0 0 
5804 8 5 10 4 3 30 6 1 0 0 
5807 6 3 7 3 3 22 4 5 0 0 
5813 7 3 6 3 3 22 6 1 0 0 
5829 5 5 8 2 3 23 4 7 0 1 
5844 9 5 9 4 3 30 9 4 0 0 
5849 6 4 8 3 3 24 5 6 0 1 
5875 7 5 9 3 3 27 3 7 0 0 
5881 9 6 10 4 3 32 4 1 0 0 
5889 6 5 9 3 3 26 4 4 0 0 
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5895 5 4 9 2 3 23 1 3 0 0 
5896 8 5 9 4 3 29 4 3 0 0 
5898 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 6 1 0 
5899 5 4 8 4 3 24 3 4 0 0 
5910 9 5 9 4 3 30 5 3 0 0 
5925 8 5 9 3 3 28 4 3 0 0 
5928 7 4 9 3 3 26 9 6 0 1 
5939 5 3 8 3 2 21 1 5 0 0 
5969 8 5 9 4 3 29 7 2 0 0 
5990 6 4 7 3 3 23 1 5 0 1 
6003 9 5 9 4 3 30 3 4 0 0 
6017 5 4 8 3 3 23 1 5 0 0 
6024 6 5 6 3 3 23 9 2 0 0 
6048 6 5 9 3 3 26 1 6 0 1 
6059 6 3 6 3 3 21 5 3 0 1 
6066 5 4 7 3 3 22 4 8 0 1 
6076 5 4 9 3 3 24 7 5 0 0 
6102 5 4 8 4 3 24 1 6 1 1 
6124 7 3 8 3 3 24 7 6 0 0 
6131 7 6 9 4 3 29 3 3 0 0 
6149 6 4 8 3 3 24 1 5 0 0 
6172 8 5 8 4 3 28 1 4 0 0 
6181 5 4 8 3 3 23 1 8 0 1 
6216 7 5 9 4 3 28 6 6 0 1 
6221 8 5 9 4 3 29 9 3 0 1 
6222 6 4 7 3 3 23 9 5 1 0 
6231 9 6 9 4 3 31 5 4 0 0 
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6234 5 4 9 3 3 24 4 5 0 0 
6235 9 6 10 4 3 32 7 4 0 0 
6236 9 6 7 4 3 29 4 4 1 1 
6237 8 3 8 3 2 24 9 4 0 1 
6243 7 4 8 3 3 25 1 4 0 0 
6259 7 6 9 3 3 28 3 4 0 0 
6262 7 3 8 4 3 25 7 8 1 1 
6271 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 3 0 0 
6291 5 4 7 3 2 21 9 6 1 0 
6310 7 4 8 3 3 25 4 4 1 1 
6314 9 5 8 4 3 29 5 1 1 0 
6328 6 4 7 4 3 24 3 3 0 0 
6372 6 4 8 4 3 25 5 4 0 0 
6389 9 4 9 4 3 29 3 2 1 0 
6419 9 6 9 4 3 31 9 7 0 1 
6425 5 4 9 3 3 24 4 3 0 0 
6428 9 5 9 3 3 29 4 2 0 0 
6437 5 4 7 3 3 22 3 4 0 0 
6453 7 5 9 3 3 27 4 3 0 0 
6455 7 6 9 3 3 28 9 4 0 1 
6456 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 4 0 0 
6489 5 4 8 3 3 23 3 4 1 0 
6495 8 5 9 4 3 29 6 2 1 1 
6510 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 8 0 1 
6514 8 4 9 3 3 27 7 1 0 0 
6542 6 4 9 3 3 25 7 5 1 0 
6564 6 5 8 3 3 25 3 8 0 1 
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6614 9 5 9 3 3 29 4 3 1 0 
6622 8 4 9 3 3 27 9 2 0 0 
6665 4 4 7 3 2 20 9 6 1 1 
6688 9 5 10 4 3 31 6 2 1 0 
6729 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 7 0 1 
6732 5 4 7 2 3 21 1 6 0 0 
6759 9 6 9 4 3 31 4 2 0 0 
6772 5 4 7 2 3 21 9 8 1 1 
6813 8 6 10 3 3 30 4 4 0 0 
6816 8 6 8 4 3 29 6 2 0 0 
6852 8 4 8 4 3 27 3 5 0 0 
6854 4 4 4 2 3 17 1 5 0 0 
6855 6 4 8 4 3 25 3 4 0 0 
6868 4 4 8 3 3 22 7 3 0 0 
6872 5 4 7 3 3 22 1 3 0 0 
6873 8 6 8 4 3 29 5 2 1 0 
6905 7 3 7 2 3 22 7 2 1 0 
6924 7 5 7 3 3 25 4 2 0 0 
6929 5 4 8 3 3 23 9 6 0 1 
6930 8 6 9 4 3 30 6 4 0 1 
6934 4 4 7 3 2 20 9 8 0 1 
6949 8 6 9 4 3 30 4 3 1 0 
6953 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 1 1 0 
6966 8 5 8 3 3 27 1 2 0 0 
6968 9 4 7 4 3 27 9 3 0 0 
6975 8 4 8 4 3 27 6 1 1 0 
6981 5 4 8 3 3 23 1 5 0 1 
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6984 3 4 3 2 2 14 1 8 0 1 
7027 5 4 8 3 3 23 3 3 0 0 
7060 7 4 6 3 3 23 3 5 0 1 
7074 8 6 9 4 3 30 1 5 0 1 
7083 3 3 5 2 2 15 9 4 0 1 
7103 8 6 9 4 3 30 3 3 0 0 
7107 7 5 9 3 3 27 6 1 0 0 
7129 6 3 7 3 3 22 4 4 0 0 
7144 7 4 7 3 3 24 3 6 0 1 
7172 9 6 10 4 3 32 3 4 0 0 
7186 5 5 9 3 3 25 4 4 0 0 
7239 8 5 8 3 3 27 1 6 0 1 
7240 6 4 8 2 3 23 4 8 0 1 
7249 9 4 8 4 3 28 4 2 0 0 
7263 6 3 6 4 2 21 7 1 0 0 
7274 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 4 0 0 
7297 8 5 8 4 3 28 9 6 0 0 
7316 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 8 0 1 
7344 7 5 8 4 3 27 3 6 1 0 
7366 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 6 0 1 
7374 9 6 10 4 3 32 4 3 0 1 
7378 9 6 9 4 3 31 4 3 0 0 
7390 8 6 9 3 3 29 3 4 1 0 
7395 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 3 0 0 
7400 7 4 8 3 3 25 4 7 0 1 
7413 9 6 10 4 3 32 5 3 0 1 
7420 4 4 5 3 3 19 1 8 0 1 
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7434 7 5 9 3 3 27 4 5 0 0 
7450 7 4 8 3 3 25 4 5 0 0 
7454 9 5 10 4 3 31 6 1 0 0 
7459 6 5 9 3 3 26 1 3 0 0 
7463 6 4 7 3 3 23 4 7 0 1 
7467 4 4 7 3 3 21 1 4 0 0 
7472 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 3 0 0 
7495 5 4 8 3 3 23 4 4 0 1 
7496 8 6 9 2 3 28 5 4 0 0 
7504 5 4 7 3 2 21 7 8 1 0 
7545 9 5 9 4 3 30 3 4 0 0 
7568 7 4 8 3 3 25 4 7 0 0 
7569 5 4 8 3 3 23 1 8 0 1 
7583 5 4 8 3 3 23 3 4 0 0 
7593 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 8 0 1 
7602 7 4 8 3 3 25 4 3 0 1 
7614 9 6 10 4 3 32 4 1 0 0 
7618 8 6 9 4 3 30 7 3 0 0 
7639 6 4 9 3 3 25 7 8 0 1 
7658 9 5 9 4 3 30 7 3 0 0 
7660 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 4 1 0 
7677 8 6 9 3 3 29 1 5 0 1 
7678 5 4 8 2 3 22 1 7 0 1 
7679 8 4 9 3 3 27 4 4 0 0 
7689 7 5 9 3 3 27 9 4 0 1 
7718 8 4 9 4 3 28 7 2 0 0 
7719 4 4 7 3 2 20 9 2 0 0 
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7724 8 6 9 4 3 30 3 4 0 1 
7742 5 4 8 3 3 23 4 5 0 0 
7748 7 5 9 3 3 27 4 5 0 1 
7769 8 5 8 4 3 28 3 4 1 0 
7784 6 5 8 3 3 25 4 8 0 1 
7786 5 4 6 3 3 21 4 4 0 0 
7821 6 4 8 3 3 24 4 5 0 1 
7840 4 4 8 3 2 21 1 8 1 1 
7853 5 5 8 3 3 24 7 8 0 1 
7859 6 6 9 3 3 27 3 5 0 1 
7873 6 4 7 2 3 22 3 5 0 1 
7900 8 4 9 4 3 28 3 4 0 0 
7910 5 4 7 2 3 21 1 8 0 1 
7911 5 4 7 2 3 21 1 6 0 1 
7923 8 6 9 3 3 29 1 4 0 0 
7959 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 4 0 0 
7963 9 4 9 3 3 28 9 1 1 0 
7967 8 3 8 4 3 26 7 3 0 0 
7968 9 6 9 4 3 31 3 4 0 1 
7976 5 4 7 3 3 22 5 8 0 1 
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Appendix 4: Aggregated HAI Data and HRO Score 
 
Hospital 
Type 
Region BSC Gov Teaching 
Status 
CLASBI CAUTI SSI 
HRO 
Score 
1200 1 2 0 0   2.2160 27 
1300 1 3 0 0 0.2037 0.8811 0.9735 25.889 
1301 1 3 0 1 0.0463 0.8270 2.6470 26.333 
1400 1 4 0 0 0.5257 0.8974 1.0513 24.727 
1401 1 4 0 1 0.6505 1.0407 0.9659 24.857 
1500 1 5 0 0 0.4749 1.0640 0.9395 23.444 
1501 1 5 0 1 0.5865 1.3382 0.9971 25.250 
1511 1 5 1 1 0.0613 1.2443 1.6150 21.50 
1600 1 6 0 0 0.2523 1.2830 0.6233 23.250 
1601 1 6 0 1 0.6254 1.3505 0.9845 22.636 
1611 1 6 1 1 1.0822 1.5252 2.1033 22.60 
1700 1 7 0 0 1.0110 2.2240 0.6930 20 
1701 1 7 0 1 0.3954 1.4053 1.2555 22.667 
1711 1 7 1 1 0.5010 0.8820 0 22 
1800 1 8 0 0 0.3305 0.8560 0.4780 18 
1801 1 8 0 1 0.4815 1.3836 1.0732 21.455 
1811 1 8 1 1 0.4987 1.1968 1.0744 20.667 
3100 3 1 0 0   1.9770 31.667 
3200 3 2 0 0 0.6070 0.9390 0 26.333 
3300 3 3 0 0 0.5686 0.6677 0.5469 28.067 
3301 3 3 0 1 0 0.9327 0.3715 24 
3400 3 4 0 0 0.4428 0.7651 0.7231 26.304 
3401 3 4 0 1 0.4727 0.7358 0.8614 27.625 
3410 3 4 1 0 0.4743 0.8886 0.7475 27.429 
3500 3 5 0 0 0.6420 1.1024 0.7899 28.167 
3501 3 5 0 1 0.6105 1.0396 0.7943 25 
3510 3 5 1 0 0.4891 1.5857 0.6269 28.5 
3600 3 6 0 0 0.5720 1.3072 0.7199 26.20 
3601 3 6 0 1 0.4841 1.0410 0.8113 24.667 
3610 3 6 1 0 0.6511 0.9907 0.8667 27.25 
3700 3 7 0 0 0.2224 0.9864 0.9895 28.600 
3701 3 7 0 1 0.5370 1.6019 1.2026 24 
3800 3 8 0 0 0.4789 1.0784 0.8578 24.75 
3801 3 8 0 1 0.5268 1.2491 0.9120 25.667 
3811 3 8 1 1 0.6849 1.6152 1.0232 27 
4100 4 1 0 0   0.3125 29.571 
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Type 
Region BSC Gov Teaching 
Status 
CLASBI CAUTI SSI 
HRO 
Score 
4200 4 2 0 0 0.8070 0.3157 2.0750 28 
4201 4 2 0 1 0 0 1.9930 30 
4300 4 3 0 0 0.2805 0.4834 0.6795 26.739 
4301 4 3 0 1 1.1085 0.7128 0.7279 28.5 
4310 4 3 1 0 0 0.5670 1.4118 30.333 
4311 4 3 1 1  0  30 
4400 4 4 0 0 0.5261 0.8677 1.0246 25.074 
4401 4 4 0 1 0.4477 0.8101 0.8127 25 
4410 4 4 1 0 0.3482 0.9258 0.9938 27 
4411 4 4 1 1 1.0765 0.6585 0.1893 27 
4500 4 5 0 0 0.3772 0.5919 0.5287 24.053 
4501 4 5 0 1 0.4373 1.1646 0.7961 24.714 
4600 4 6 0 0 0.6485 0.8442 0.8397 25.667 
4601 4 6 0 1 0.4432 1.0079 0.9930 24.60 
4700 4 7 0 0 0.5220 1.0320 1.5710 23.333 
4701 4 7 0 1 0.4363 1.0395 0.9019 22 
4801 4 8 0 1 0.3968 1.2405 0.9246 24.417 
5100 5 1 0 0  3.6760  32 
5200 5 2 0 0  0 0 26.5 
5300 5 3 0 0 0.4740 0.6758 0.4500 29.333 
5310 5 3 1 0  0 0.3895 23 
5400 5 4 0 0 0.6644 0.8441 0.7739 29.25 
5401 5 4 0 1 0.2377 0.5010 0.1800 21.5 
5410 5 4 1 0 0.3627 0.7996 0.7130 30.5 
5500 5 5 0 0 0.6120 1.4472 0.5598 27.167 
5501 5 5 0 1 0.3944 0.8228 0.7325 26 
5510 5 5 1 0 0.8271 1.0844 0.3353 30 
5601 5 6 0 1 0.5325 1.2565 0.8024 24 
5610 5 6 1 0 0.6030 0.7032 0.7103 28 
5801 5 8 0 1 0.6124 1.4671 0.8357 24 
5811 5 8 1 1 0.5773 1.4571 0.9527 27 
6200 6 2 0 0 2.7400 1.0910  27.286 
6300 6 3 0 0 0.2240 0.5733 0.6696 24.333 
6301 6 3 0 1 0.7303 0.7232 1.3167 32 
6310 6 3 1 0  0 0.7635 27.667 
6400 6 4 0 0 0.5437 0.9716 1.1101 27.667 
6401 6 4 0 1 0.4094 1.2819 1.2099 30 
6500 6 5 0 0 0.8673 1.7498 0.7320 28 
6501 6 5 0 1 0.4238 1.0961 0.8996 27 
 
109 
Hospital 
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Region BSC Gov Teaching 
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CLASBI CAUTI SSI 
HRO 
Score 
6600 6 6 0 0 0.2460 0.6490 0.1770 26 
6601 6 6 0 1 0.3233 1.2406 1.0476 28 
6700 6 7 0 0 0.7470 1.3120 1.6580 24 
6701 6 7 0 1 0.3808 1.2704 0.8918 30 
6801 6 8 0 1 0.4106 1.2810 0.9456 18 
6811 6 8 1 1 0.4620 1.3110 1.7970 19 
7200 7 2 0 0 0.4164 0.5761 0.7891 28.800 
7300 7 3 0 0 0.5358 0.6139 0.7649 24.875 
7310 7 3 1 0  0.6820 0 30 
7400 7 4 0 0 0.5280 0.8298 0.8633 27.400 
7401 7 4 0 1 0.6568 0.9447 0.7921 26.667 
7410 7 4 1 0 0.1197 0.1772 0.6992 23 
7411 7 4 1 1 0.8080 0.8640 0.3912 28 
7500 7 5 0 0 0.6568 1.0734 0.7790 26.5 
7501 7 5 0 1 0.4618 0.8143 0.5556 26 
7510 7 5 1 0 0.2510 0.8027 0.7780 24 
7600 7 6 0 0 0.6132 1.2090 0.7430 24 
7601 7 6 0 1 0.6005 1.0221 0.8633 26 
7610 7 6 1 0 0.2318 1.3885 0.7483 24 
7700 7 7 0 0 0.8770 1.2875 1.4390 29 
7701 7 7 0 1 0.5183 1.0519 0.6234 27 
7711 7 7 1 1 0.6337 1.0330 0.9097 23 
7801 7 8 0 1 0.5402 1.1332 0.9858 25 
7811 7 8 1 1 0.5354 1.3604 1.4986 25 
9200 9 2 0 0  0.4248 1.0412 27.42 
9201 9 2 0 1   0 31 
9210 9 2 1 0 0 1.6270 0.2910 26 
9300 9 3 0 0 0.4542 0.4378 1.2452 26.83 
9301 9 3 0 1 0.6290 0.3480 1.0471 29.5 
9400 9 4 0 0 0.6414 0.9288 0.8714 25.143 
9401 9 4 0 1 0.4322 0.8471 1.0445 25.167 
9410 9 4 1 0 0.3438 0.4541 0.5136 24.5 
9500 9 5 0 0 0.6010 1.0332 0.6292 29 
9501 9 5 0 1 0.5010 1.1078 0.9261 25 
9510 9 5 1 0 0.3405 1.4420 0.4063 23 
9511 9 5 1 1 0.4546 0.9617 0.8856 24 
9600 9 6 0 0 0.5655 1.0486 0.8450 25.33 
9601 9 6 0 1 0.3895 1.2449 0.8209 25.71 
9610 9 6 1 0 0.7930 1.0050 1.2760 21 
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Status 
CLASBI CAUTI SSI 
HRO 
Score 
9611 9 6 1 1 0.4565 1.0255 1.1050 20 
9700 9 7 0 0 0.5083 1.9233 1.0457 24.33 
9701 9 7 0 1 0.3698 1.0859 0.8876 27.5 
9711 9 7 1 1 0.5460 1.7310 1.5844 18 
9800 9 8 0 0 0.5242 0.7594 1.1063 29 
9801 9 8 0 1 0.3837 1.3850 1.0993 22 
9811 9 8 1 1 0.3625 1.1387 0.8828 20.33 
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Appendix 5: Independent Analysis Results  
 
 
Table A.3: Frequencies for the HAI Data Set by Region 
 
 
Region Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 New England/Mid-Atlantic 418 17.3% 17.3% 17.3 
3 South Atlantic 469 19.5% 19.5% 36.8 
4 E. North Central 419 17.4% 17.4% 54.2 
5 E. South Central 181 7.5% 7.5% 61.7 
6 W. North Central 132 5.5% 5.5% 67.2 
7 W. South Central 297 12.3% 12.3% 79.5 
9 Mountain/Pacific 495 20.5% 20.5% 100.0 
 
Total 2411 100.0% 100.0%  
 
 
Table A.4: Frequencies for the HAI Data Set by Control Type 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Non- Government 2084 86.4% 87.1% 87.1 
Government 309 12.8% 12.9% 100.0 
Total 2393 99.3% 100.0  
Missing  18 .7%   
Total 2411 100.0%   
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Table A.5: Frequencies for the HAI Data Set by Hospital Size 
 
BSC Number of Staff Beds Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 6-24 beds 4 .2% .2% .2 
2 25-49 beds 45 1.9% 1.9% 2.0 
3 50-99 beds 270 11.2% 11.3% 13.3 
4 100-199 beds 769 31.9% 32.1% 45.4 
5 200-299 beds 535 22.2% 22.3% 67.7 
6 300-399 beds 316 13.1% 13.2% 80.9 
7 400-499 beds 171 7.1% 7.1% 88.1 
8 500+  beds 286 11.9% 11.9% 100.0 
 
Total 2369 99.4% 100.0%  
Missing 15 0.6   
 Total 2411 100.0%   
 
 
Table A.6: Frequencies for the HAI Data Set by Teaching Status 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Non-Teaching 1064 44.1% 44.4% 44.4 
Teaching 1330 55.2% 55.6% 100.0 
Total 2394 99.3% 100.0  
Missing  17 .7%   
Total 2411 100.0%   
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Table A.7: Frequencies for the HRO Data Set by Region 
 
 
Region Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 New England/Mid-Atlantic 93 15.2% 15.2% 15.2 
3 South Atlantic 121 19.8% 19.8% 35.0 
4 E. North Central 161 26.3% 26.3% 61.3 
5 E. South Central 52 8.5% 8.5% 69.8 
6 W. North Central 46 7.5% 7.5% 77.3 
7 W. South Central 65 10.6% 10.6% 87.9 
9 Mountain/Pacific 74 12.1% 12.1% 100.0 
 
Total 612 100.0% 100.0%  
 
 
Table A.8: Frequencies for the HRO Data Set by Hospital Size 
 
BSC Number of Staff Beds Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 6-24 beds 33 5.4% 5.4% 5.4 
2 25-49 beds 88 14.4% 14.4% 19.8 
3 50-99 beds 96 15.7% 15.7% 35.5 
4 100-199 beds 140 22.9% 22.9% 58.3 
5 200-299 beds 93 15.2% 15.2% 73.5 
6 300-399 beds 63 10.3% 10.3% 83.8 
7 400-499 beds 35 5.7% 5.7% 89.5 
8 500+  beds 64 10.5% 10.5% 100.0 
 
Total 612 100.0% 100.0%  
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Table A.9: Frequencies for the HRO Data Set by Control Type 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Non- Government 513 83.8% 83.8% 83.8 
Government 99 16.2% 16.2% 100.0 
Total 612 100.0% 100.0%  
 
 
 
Table A.10: Frequencies for the HRO Data Set by Teaching Status 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Non-Teaching 397 64.9% 64.9% 64.9 
Teaching 215 35.1% 35.1% 100.0 
Total 612 100.0% 100.0%  
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Table A.11: HAI Descriptive Output for Hospitals by Region 
 
Region N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min Max 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CLABSI 1 352 .5380 .52160 .02780 .4833 .5927 .00 3.40 
3 390 .5337 .46856 .02373 .4870 .5803 .00 2.72 
4 334 .4711 .45856 .02509 .4217 .5204 .00 2.86 
5 131 .5980 .51875 .04532 .5084 .6877 .00 2.34 
6 101 .4720 .49089 .04884 .3751 .5690 .00 2.74 
7 243 .5474 .50861 .03263 .4832 .6117 .00 3.29 
9 430 .4979 .55236 .02664 .4456 .5503 .00 4.77 
Total 1981 .5189 .50547 .01136 .4967 .5412 .00 4.77 
CAUTI 1 399 1.1911 .94288 .04720 1.0983 1.2839 .00 6.01 
3 448 1.0256 .91021 .04300 .9411 1.1101 .00 4.98 
4 373 .9379 .84208 .04360 .8521 1.0236 .00 5.50 
5 174 1.0221 1.11138 .08425 .8558 1.1884 .00 8.77 
6 117 1.1467 .85069 .07865 .9910 1.3025 .00 3.18 
7 282 .9189 .86217 .05134 .8178 1.0199 .00 5.62 
9 464 1.0343 .92511 .04295 .9499 1.1186 .00 5.16 
Total 2257 1.0348 .91995 .01936 .9968 1.0728 .00 8.77 
SSI 1 374 1.0672 .91086 .04710 .9746 1.1598 .00 5.83 
3 375 .8227 .74685 .03857 .7469 .8985 .00 5.14 
4 375 .9025 .80987 .04182 .8202 .9847 .00 5.32 
5 138 .6765 .67107 .05713 .5635 .7895 .00 3.41 
6 118 1.0408 .99205 .09133 .8599 1.2217 .00 5.64 
7 238 .8135 .68126 .04416 .7265 .9005 .00 3.56 
9 417 .9232 .74273 .03637 .8517 .9947 .00 3.58 
Total 2035 .9046 .80056 .01775 .8698 .9394 .00 5.83 
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Table A.12: HAI Descriptive Output for Hospitals by Bed Size 
 
BSC   N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min Max 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CLABSI 2 10 .6436 .91545 .28949 -.0113 1.2985 .00 2.74 
3 93 .4609 .64610 .06700 .3278 .5939 .00 2.86 
4 582 .5354 .64046 .02655 .4833 .5875 .00 4.77 
5 494 .5464 .48900 .02200 .5032 .5896 .00 2.88 
6 312 .5174 .40884 .02315 .4719 .5629 .00 1.90 
7 168 .4798 .33642 .02596 .4286 .5310 .00 1.63 
8 284 .4936 .29453 .01748 .4592 .5280 .00 1.71 
Total 1943 .5214 .50691 .01150 .4988 .5439 .00 4.77 
CAUTI 2 24 .5225 .82879 .16918 .1725 .8724 .00 3.25 
3 215 .6537 .92098 .06281 .5298 .7775 .00 5.22 
4 717 .8695 .97258 .03632 .7982 .9408 .00 6.01 
5 516 1.1281 .96330 .04241 1.0448 1.2114 .00 8.77 
6 315 1.1689 .85485 .04817 1.0742 1.2637 .00 4.45 
7 169 1.2927 .75107 .05777 1.1786 1.4068 .00 4.57 
8 286 1.2975 .65477 .03872 1.2213 1.3737 .00 3.52 
Total 2242 1.0332 .92009 .01943 .9951 1.0713 .00 8.77 
SSI 2 6 1.1152 1.03205 .42133 .0321 2.1982 .00 2.74 
3 110 .7631 .85585 .08160 .6013 .9248 .00 5.08 
4 536 .8772 .86342 .03729 .8039 .9505 .00 5.83 
5 476 .8183 .77463 .03551 .7486 .8881 .00 5.47 
6 305 .8916 .71921 .04118 .8106 .9727 .00 4.80 
7 166 1.0434 .70988 .05510 .9346 1.1522 .00 3.77 
8 283 1.0059 .61574 .03660 .9339 1.0779 .00 3.84 
Total 1882 .8927 .77461 .01786 .8577 .9278 .00 5.83 
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Table A.13: Student T-Test Result by Control Type 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances T-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CLABSI Equal variances 
assumed 
.301 .583 -1.086 1964 .278 -.03814 .03513 -.10705 .03076 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.157 315.83 .248 -.03814 .03296 -.10300 .02671 
CAUTI Equal variances 
assumed 
.661 .416 -1.541 2240 .123 -.08912 .05782 -.20252 .02427 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.525 380.69 .128 -.08912 .05843 -.20401 .02576 
SSI Equal variances 
assumed 
9.958 .002 -1.713 2016 .087 -.09207 .05375 -.19748 .01334 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.531 309.25 .127 -.09207 .06015 -.21043 .02629 
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Table A.14: Student T-Test Result by Teaching Status 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances T-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CLABSI Equal variances 
assumed 
51.896 .000 1.686 1964 .092 .03973 .02356 -.00648 .08593 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.583 1265.05 .114 .03973 .02510 -.00951 .08897 
CAUTI Equal variances 
assumed 
3.982 .046 -5.972 2240 .000 -.23318 .03905 -.30975 -.15661 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -5.882 1938.22 .000 -.23318 .03964 -.31093 -.15543 
SSI Equal variances 
assumed 
1.817 .178 -3.415 2017 .001 -.12396 .03630 -.19515 -.05277 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -3.398 1697.51 .001 -.12396 .03648 -.19551 -.05241 
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